Daniel Wesson
Diamondback EnergyAbout Daniel Wesson
Diamondback Energy’s Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer since February 2022, Daniel N. Wesson, age 41, holds a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from Louisiana State University and joined Diamondback in 2012 after engineering roles at ConocoPhillips (2007–2010) and BOPCO L.P. (2010–2012) . Under management’s scorecards that include ROACE and environmental/safety targets, Diamondback delivered 2024 net cash from operations of $6.4B and Free Cash Flow of $3.6B, and achieved top-quartile one-year TSR vs oil-weighted peers, informing a 170% of target 2024 bonus payout to NEOs including Wesson .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Diamondback Energy | EVP & COO | Feb 2022–Present | Leads operations and execution across Permian assets, integrating Endeavor merger synergies . |
| Diamondback Energy | EVP, Operations; SVP, Operations; VP, Operations; Completions Manager; Operations Engineer | 2012–Feb 2022 | Built operating cadence and completions best practices through multiple roles pre- and post-IPO . |
| BOPCO L.P. | Operations/Engineering roles | 2010–2012 | Private E&P operational roles in Permian, contributing to field development . |
| ConocoPhillips | Operations/Engineering roles | 2007–2010 | Major integrated E&P experience, strengthening engineering toolkit . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Permian Basin Society of Petroleum Engineers | Member | Not disclosed | Professional engagement and industry best-practice alignment . |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $541,667 | $600,000 | $650,000 |
| Target Bonus (% of Base) | 90% | 90% | 100% |
| Target Bonus ($) | $487,500 | $540,000 | $650,000 |
| Actual Bonus Paid ($) | $568,960 | $567,000 | $1,105,000 (170% of target) |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive Type | Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual Incentive (2024) | Company scorecard (financial/operational) with environmental & safety metrics | Environmental & safety weighted 25% | 100% of base ($650,000) | NEO scorecard adjusted to 170% for transformational execution | $1,105,000 (170%) | Cash (2024 performance) |
| PSUs (2024 grant) | Relative TSR vs peer group (S&P 500 and XOP Index double-weighted) with absolute TSR modifier | 60% of total LTI | 11,826 target units | In performance period (2024–2026) | 0–250% of target (program design) | Performance period ends 12/31/2026 |
| RSUs (2024 grant) | Time-based | 40% of total LTI | 7,883 units | 1/3 vested 3/1/2024; remaining vest 3/1/2025 and 3/1/2026 | N/A | Time-based schedule |
Notes:
- TSR peer group double-weights both S&P 500 and XOP Index to align with broader market and sector performance .
- Absolute TSR modifier adjusts PSU payouts down for negative TSR, targets for 0–15% annual TSR, and up for >15% annual TSR .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 74,127 shares; less than 1% of outstanding common stock (294,082,951) . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Company maintains rigorous executive ownership guidelines; compliance monitored annually (specific multiples not disclosed) . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Hedging and pledging prohibited; no margin accounts; Rule 10b5-1 plans allowed with pre-approval . |
| RSUs (Unvested, selected schedules) | 2,627 RSUs vest on 3/1/2026 from 2024 grant ; retention RSUs (2019 grant): 5,276 RSUs vest in four equal annual installments beginning 3/1/2026 (1,319/year) . |
| PSUs Outstanding (Diamondback) | 33,223 max units for 2023–2025 cycle; 29,565 max units for 2024–2026 cycle . |
| PSUs Outstanding (Viper LTIP) | 6,957 target units for 2024–2026 cycle (Viper) . |
| 2024 Stock Vested | 40,298 shares; value realized $6,940,769 . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Key Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | No individual employment agreements; executives participate in Senior Management Severance Plan . |
| Termination without Cause / Resignation for Good Reason | Base salary continuation 1x for 18 months ($975,000), pro-rated target bonus for year ($650,000), up to 18 months COBRA reimbursement ($37,674); unvested equity follows award terms (no automatic vest) . |
| Change-in-Control (No Termination) | Payment of target annual incentive bonus only (e.g., $650,000 for Wesson) . |
| Change-in-Control + Qualifying Termination (Double-trigger) | Lump-sum cash = 2.5x base salary + 3-year average bonus; target bonus for year; up to 18 months COBRA; double-trigger vesting of unvested RSUs/PSUs per award agreements. Estimated totals for Wesson: $4,142,467 cash, $37,674 COBRA, $8,500,933 equity, $12,681,074 total . |
| Death/Disability | 1x base for 18 months ($975,000), target bonus ($650,000), COBRA reimbursement; PSUs settle at target at period end per award terms . |
| Non-Compete/Non-Solicit | Severance conditioned on non-compete agreement for a specified period (duration not disclosed) . |
| Clawback Policy | Comprehensive incentive compensation clawback compliant with Nasdaq Rule 10D-1 . |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Shift to equity-heavy compensation with PSUs and RSUs; options not featured and repricing prohibited .
- Pay mix emphasizes performance alignment; 60% of 2024 LTI in PSUs tied to relative and absolute TSR, reinforcing stockholder alignment .
- Annual incentive includes a 25% weighting for environmental and safety metrics, responding to investor feedback; committee applied a 25% discretionary multiplier to NEO payouts based on Endeavor integration success and top-quartile TSR, yielding 170% of target for 2024 .
Say-on-Pay, Peer Group, and Governance Signals
- Say-on-pay approval approximately 96.5% in 2024, indicating strong investor support .
- Compensation benchmarking utilizes a 12-company E&P peer group; TSR peer group includes S&P 500 and XOP Index double-weighted for PSU awards to balance sector and broad market performance .
- Company prohibits hedging/pledging and maintains rigorous insider trading controls, reducing alignment risk .
Investment Implications
- Near-term vesting: RSU tranches vest on 3/1/2026, including 2,627 units from 2024 grants and 1,319/year from 2019 retention awards through 2029, which may create periodic liquidity events as awards settle .
- Alignment: Heavy PSU weighting with double-trigger CoC vesting and TSR-based metrics supports long-term shareholder alignment; prohibitions on hedging/pledging and an active clawback reduce governance risk .
- Retention: Robust severance economics under double-trigger CoC ($12.7M illustrative total for Wesson) combined with multi-cycle PSU exposures and multi-year RSU schedules suggest moderate retention risk; severance conditioned on non-compete enhances retention and transition controls .
- Performance signal: Committee’s 25% multiplier to 2024 bonuses reflects confidence in strategic execution (Endeavor integration, top-quartile TSR), but introduces an element of discretion to quantitative scorecards investors should monitor for consistency over time .