Steven Baert
About Steven Baert
Steven Baert is Chief People Officer of GE Vernova, responsible for workforce planning, talent acquisition and development, compensation and benefits, labor and employee relations, HR operations, engagement and inclusion, and Safety, Health, and Security; he joined GE Vernova’s businesses in April 2023 and has served as CPO since the Spin-Off to GE Vernova Inc. . He is 50 years old (as disclosed in the 2025 proxy), holds an MBA (Vlerick Business School), a Master of Laws (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), and a Bachelor of Laws (Katholieke Universiteit Brussels), and previously served as Chief People & Organization Officer and Executive Committee member at Novartis (2014–2021) . Company-wide 2024 performance metrics that drove executive incentives included free cash flow, adjusted EBITDA, and organic revenue growth; GE Vernova achieved $1.701B FCF, $2.035B adjusted EBITDA, and 7% organic revenue growth, underpinning incentive payouts for corporate executives in 2024 .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE Vernova businesses | Chief People Officer | Apr 2023–Spin-Off (Apr 2024) | Led people and organization through spin preparation and transition to public company . |
| Novartis | Chief People & Organization Officer; Executive Committee member | 2014–Sep 2021 | Global HR leadership; roles across Emerging Growth Markets, U.S./Canada HR, and Novartis Oncology HR . |
| Flagship Pioneering | Human Capital Officer & Senior Partner (advisor) | Sep 2021–2022 | Advised VC portfolio on human capital matters . |
| Propuli GmbH | Managing Partner (advisor) | 2022–Mar 2023 | Human capital advisory to PE/VC clients . |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb; Unilever | Senior HR positions | Prior to Novartis | Senior HR leadership experience in large-cap multinationals . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pharming Group N.V. | Non-executive director; Chair, Remuneration Committee; Member, Corporate Governance Committee | Current | Public company directorship (Nasdaq: PHAR as disclosed) . |
| Servier SAS | Non-executive director, Supervisory Board | Current | Private French pharmaceuticals company . |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Year/Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $900,000 | Offer letter dated Jan 12, 2023 | . |
| Target Annual Bonus (AEIP) | 85% of base salary (2023 plan year) | Offer letter; 2023 performance year | . |
| Long-Term Incentive (LTI) | $2,500,000 grant value for 2023; 50% PSUs (Monte Carlo), 50% RSUs (30-day avg price) | 2023 | . |
| Cash Sign-on | $250,000; repayable if resign within 1 year or for “Cause” | 2023 | . |
| Mobility/Perqs | Children’s Education Allowance (est. $41,000); Host Transportation Allowance ($8,000–$12,000/yr) | 2023 | . |
Performance Compensation
| AEIP Metric (Corporate) | Weight | Threshold | Target | Maximum | 2024 Result | Payout Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow* ($MM) | 40% | $500 | $1,000 | $2,000 | $1,701 | 170% . |
| Adjusted EBITDA* ($MM) | 40% | $1,500 | $2,000 | $3,000 | $2,035 | 104% . |
| Organic Revenue* Growth (%) | 20% | 2.5% | 5% | 10% | 7% | 131% . |
| Safety & Sustainability Modifier | ± up to 10 pts | — | — | — | Applied: -10% (corporate NEOs) | Committee-applied modifier . |
| LTI Element | Design | Vesting/Term | Performance Metrics | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 3-year performance units | Over 3-year period | Three-year cumulative FCF*, Adjusted EBITDA*, and relative TSR (2024–2026) | Targets disclosed at period end due to competitive sensitivity . |
| RSUs | Time-based restricted stock units | Retentive, per plan | N/A | Part of annual target mix . |
| Stock Options | Options | Typically 3-year vesting; 10-year term | Stock price appreciation | Annual grants contribute to long-term decision-making . |
Program notes: Executive compensation program aligns pay with performance via base salary, annual AEIP, and LTI mix of 50% PSUs, 30% RSUs, and 20% options; payouts are capped to discourage risk-taking; clawbacks apply to cash and equity incentive awards .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/Guideline | Details | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Executive Stock Ownership Guideline | CEO: 6x base salary; Other executive officers: 3x base salary | . |
| Counting Toward Guideline | Direct/beneficial shares, unvested RSUs, stock in Company retirement plans count; unvested PSUs and options do NOT count | . |
| Holding Requirement | Until compliant, must hold 50% of net shares from RSU/PSU vestings or option exercises | . |
| Anti-Hedging/Pledging | Executives and directors prohibited from all derivative/short transactions and from pledging Company stock | . |
| Clawback | Clawback policy applies to all cash and equity incentive awards | . |
Beneficial ownership: The 2025 proxy presents director/NEO ownership and states no shares are pledged; Steven Baert is not listed among the 2024 NEOs in the 2025 SCT and ownership tables, and his specific shareholdings are not disclosed there .
Employment Terms
| Term | Key Economics/Conditions | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Employment Offer Letter | At-will; Boston-based; reports to CEO; executive team member | Jan 12, 2023 | . |
| Severance (Offer Letter) | Lump sum equal to 12 months base salary; pro-rated AEIP (if employed through Q1 of year of termination); payable if (i) termination without Cause or for Good Reason, (ii) death/disability, or (iii) spin-related change-in-control without comparable offer | Jan 12, 2023 | . |
| Good Reason (Offer Letter) | Reduction in target compensation/failure to pay; material Company breach; material adverse change in title/authority/duties/responsibilities/reporting | Jan 12, 2023 | . |
| Restrictive Covenants | Offer letter contains restrictive covenants (details redacted) | Jan 12, 2023 | . |
| Severance Amendment | Additional lump-sum equal to 6 months base salary if termination qualifies under GE Vernova U.S. Executive Severance Plan; extensive Section 409A compliance provisions including 6-month delay for specified employees | Jul 21, 2025 (filed in Q2 2025 10-Q) | . |
| Executive Change-in-Control Policy | Double-trigger: if terminated without Cause or for Good Reason within 24 months after a Change in Control, cash severance equals 1.5x base salary + 1.5x target annual bonus (2.0x for CEO); earned-but-unpaid prior-year bonus; pro-rata current-year bonus; full acceleration of time-based equity; PSUs measured at greater of target or actual at CoC and subject to continued-service criteria if assumed | Approved Sep 5, 2024 | . |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: AEIP metrics focus on cash generation and profitability (FCF, adjusted EBITDA, organic revenue), with a safety/sustainability modifier and capped payouts, and LTI PSUs include a relative TSR overlay; these mechanics tie compensation to value creation and quality-of-earnings, supporting investor alignment .
- Retention risk vs. cost: Baseline severance (12 months base + pro-rated AEIP) was enhanced in July 2025 with an extra 6 months base for qualifying terminations, and the double-trigger CoC policy (1.5x base + 1.5x bonus for executives) materially increases separation costs—mitigating flight risk but raising potential exit expense; time-based equity accelerates on CoC, and PSUs settle at ≥ target or actual at CoC, which can be a catalyst for executive liquidity events if a sale occurs .
- Trading signals: Anti-hedging/anti-pledging policies and the 50% net-share hold until guideline compliance reduce near-term insider selling pressure; however, standard annual vesting and any CoC acceleration could create episodic supply; lack of disclosed personal holdings for Baert limits direct “skin-in-the-game” sizing for investors .
- Governance quality: Robust stock ownership guidelines, clawbacks, independent compensation oversight with peer-group benchmarking (ABB, Schneider, Siemens Energy, Honeywell, Vestas, etc.) suggest disciplined pay governance and reduced red-flag risk around tax gross-ups, option repricing, or pledging/hedging .
Overall: Baert’s incentives are geared toward multi-year cash flow/EBITDA and rTSR outcomes, with retention reinforced by severance enhancements and double-trigger CoC protection; governance policies limit misalignment risk. Investors should monitor disclosures for any future personal ownership data, vesting schedules, or insider trading plans to assess incremental selling pressure and alignment.