Victor Abate
About Victor Abate
Victor Abate, 60, is Chief Executive Officer, Wind at GE Vernova (appointed April 2024). He previously served as GE’s Chief Technology Officer and SVP (2015–April 2024), led GE’s Onshore Wind (2022–2023), Gas Power Systems (2013–2015), and Renewable Energy (2005–2013). He holds B.S. and M.S. degrees in mechanical engineering from Union College and an MBA from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute . During his Wind tenure, GE Vernova improved Wind segment EBITDA losses by nearly 50% in 2024, with Onshore achieving high single-digit EBITDA margin, while company TSR in 2024 equated to $235 on a $100 investment, outpacing its peer index ($107) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| GE Vernova | CEO, Wind | Apr 2024–present | Led turnaround: Wind EBITDA losses improved ~50%; Onshore delivered high single-digit EBITDA margin in 2024 . |
| GE (Aerospace post-spin legacy) | Chief Technology Officer & SVP | 2015–Apr 2024 | Enterprise technology leadership across energy technologies . |
| GE | CEO, Onshore Wind | 2022–2023 | Led onshore fleet optimization; platform quality initiatives . |
| GE | CEO, Gas Power Systems | 2013–2015 | Launched HA gas turbine product line; step-change in efficiency . |
| GE | CEO, Renewable Energy | 2005–2013 | Grew global wind and renewables footprint . |
| Allied Signal; Zurn Industries | Engineering/Leadership roles | pre-2005 | Early career in industrials/energy . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Wind Energy Association | President, Board of Directors | Prior tenure | Sector advocacy; market development . |
| UI Labs | Board Member | Prior tenure | Industry-university innovation collaboration . |
Fixed Compensation
- Executive pay structure (company-wide): base salary, Annual Executive Incentive Plan (AEIP), and Long-Term Incentives (LTI: PSUs, RSUs, stock options), with PSU mix 50%, RSU 30%, options 20% for 2024 grants .
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base salary; other executive officers 3x; five-year compliance window; unvested PSUs/options excluded; 50% net shares retention until threshold met .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging: executives and directors prohibited from hedging or pledging company stock .
- Note: Individual base salary/bonus amounts for Victor Abate are not disclosed in the proxy; his compensation follows GE Vernova’s executive framework above .
Performance Compensation
GE Vernova AEIP metrics (company-level 2024):
| Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | Payout Level (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Free Cash Flow* ($MM) | 500 | 1,000 | 2,000 | 1,701 | 170% |
| Adjusted EBITDA* ($MM) | 1,500 | 2,000 | 3,000 | 2,035 | 104% |
| Organic Revenue* Growth (%) | 2.5% | 5% | 10% | 7% | 131% |
- Safety & sustainability modifier: -10 percentage points for AEIP payouts tied to Total Company results (three worker fatalities offset sustainability progress) .
- Segment leaders’ AEIP incorporate segment metrics (example: Power CEO payout weights 80% segment metrics, 20% corporate), with segment goals in FCF, EBITDA, organic growth; specific Wind weighting not disclosed but follows the same construct for business leaders .
- LTI PSU design (2024–2026): 50% three-year cumulative Free Cash Flow*, 50% three-year cumulative Adjusted EBITDA*, with relative TSR modifier ±20% (cap at 200% payout); PSU vests after CHCC certification post 3-year period .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (executive officer tables) do not include Victor Abate; no individual holdings disclosed for him in the proxy .
- Alignment policies: robust stock ownership rules (CEO 6x; others 3x), five-year compliance; 50% net shares retention pre-compliance ; anti-hedging/anti-pledging enforced .
- Related person note: Victor Robert Abate IV (son of Vic Abate) employed by GE Vernova as Senior Manufacturing Staff Manager – Lean Manufacturing; 2024 compensation approx. $220,000; set per standard practices without Vic Abate’s involvement .
Employment Terms
- U.S. Executive Severance Plan: employer-initiated termination without cause/role elimination—lump sum 6–18 months base salary (band-dependent); outplacement; requires separation covenants; “suitable position” defined (>=80% comp, within 50 miles, same band) .
- Change-in-Control (CIC) Policy (double-trigger): CEO 2.0x base+target bonus; other executives 1.5x base+target bonus; earned but unpaid bonus; prorated current-year bonus; full acceleration of time-based equity; performance awards treated at ≥target or actual at CIC close, subject to continued-service terms; 280G “best-net-benefit” cutback; clawback enforcement .
- Good Leaver policy: if involuntary without cause, equity held >1 year vests pro rata on original schedule; PSUs pay lesser of actual or target; violation leads to forfeiture .
- Non-compete/non-solicit covenants embedded in award agreements (typical 1-year post-termination, country-level scope; exceptions where impermissible); breach triggers cancellation/recoupment .
Performance & Track Record
GE Vernova and Wind operational performance:
| Metric | FY 2024 | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Orders ($B) | $44B | Company-wide orders growth . |
| Revenue ($B) | $35B | Strong multi-segment performance . |
| Cash from Operating Activities ($B) | $2.6B | Cash generation improvement . |
| Free Cash Flow* ($B) | $1.7B | Increased >$1B YoY . |
| Adjusted EBITDA* ($B) | $2.0B | Margin expansion . |
| Company TSR (Value of $100) | $235 | Peer group $107 (S&P 500 Industrials) . |
Wind segment (Q3 2025):
| Metric | Q3 2025 | YoY |
|---|---|---|
| Orders ($B) | $1.8 | +4% organically |
| Revenue ($B) | $2.6 | -8% reported (-9% organically) |
| EBITDA margin change (bps) | +870 bps | +1,070 bps organically |
Context: 2024 Wind improved EBITDA losses by ~50% and Onshore achieved high single-digit EBITDA margin; Offshore faced blade events and schedule delays (Abate’s remit includes executing backlog and quality/underwriting discipline) .
Compensation Governance & Peer Benchmarking
- CHCC practices: independent consultant (Pay Governance), capped payouts (200%), clawback policy (NYSE Rule 10D-1), double-trigger CIC; robust ownership/retention requirements .
- Compensation peer group (approved Apr 2024): ABB, Baker Hughes, Caterpillar, Cummins, Deere, Eaton, Emerson, Halliburton, Honeywell, Parker-Hannifin, Quanta, Schlumberger, Schneider, Siemens Energy, Vestas; market-median targeting with component benchmarking .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging mitigates misalignment risk .
- Safety performance: three fatalities in 2024 led to -10% AEIP safety/sustainability modifier on corporate payouts—heightened operational safety oversight persists into 2025 .
- Related-party sensitivity: son’s employment disclosed and governed by policy; compensation set without Abate’s involvement .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Executive incentives emphasize multi-year FCF and EBITDA, plus TSR modifier—focusing leadership on durable cash/margin expansion and shareholder returns across cycles .
- Retention: Double-trigger CIC, Good Leaver, ownership rules and option-heavy Founders equity program (company-wide) support retention; award recoupment and non-compete terms temper transition risk .
- Execution: Wind’s improving margins and onshore profitability signal progress under Abate; 2025 Wind revenue softness offset by orders/services and margin expansion, suggesting continued turnaround focus on underwriting/quality and backlog conversion .
- Governance: Prohibitions on hedging/pledging and transparent related-party policies reduce governance risk; robust CHCC oversight and peer benchmarking constrain pay inflation and sustain pay-for-performance alignment .
*Non-GAAP metrics per company appendix; see proxy for definitions .