Lance Loeffler
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO /NEW/About Lance Loeffler
Lance T. Loeffler is Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of International Paper, appointed effective April 1, 2025, after a 25+ year career in finance and operating roles, including EVP & CFO of Halliburton (2018–2022) and most recently SVP, Middle East & North Africa (2022–2024) at Halliburton; prior roles include Director at Deutsche Bank Securities (2010–2014) and earlier at UBS Investment Bank; he is 48 years old and reports to CEO Andy Silvernail . He holds an MBA (finance/accounting) and a BBA in finance from the University of Texas at Austin (McCombs) . His pay program is fully at-risk oriented: 2025 short-term incentives align to company/business-unit metrics (with individual modifiers removed), and long-term incentives are 100% performance stock units based on relative TSR, consistent with IP’s shift in 2025 to strengthen pay-for-performance .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Halliburton | Senior Vice President, MENA | 2022–2024 | Region P&L and execution leadership across Middle East & North Africa |
| Halliburton | Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer | 2018–2022 | Corporate finance leadership, capital allocation, investor communications |
| Halliburton | Vice President, Investor Relations | 2016–2018 | Market-facing strategy and investor messaging |
| Halliburton | Vice President, Corporate Development | 2014–2016 | M&A and portfolio strategy |
| Deutsche Bank Securities | Director | 2010–2014 | Investment banking and corporate finance coverage |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships were disclosed in IP’s appointment filings/press releases for Mr. Loeffler .
Fixed Compensation
| Element | Amount/Term |
|---|---|
| Base salary | $850,000 per year |
| Target annual bonus (AIP) | 100% of base salary (prorated for 2025) |
| Employment term | At-will |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – Company design and recent outcome
| Metric | Weight | 2024 Target | 2024 Actual | Payout vs Target | Weighted payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Adjusted EBITDA | 70% | $1.546B | $1.986B | 200.0% | 140.0% |
| Revenue | 20% | $18.790B | $18.618B | 95.4% | 19.1% |
| Cash Conversion | 10% | 56.9% | 67.0% | 200.0% | 20.0% |
| Total | 100% | — | — | — | 179.1% |
- 2025 AIP design change: each business unit has its own performance metrics and goals; individual performance modifiers were eliminated to emphasize collaboration and team outcomes . Mr. Loeffler participates on the same terms as the ELT (prorated in 2025) .
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)
| Plan year/vehicle | Metric(s) | Weight | Term/Vesting | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 LTIP (for ELT) | Relative TSR (vs. expanded S&P 1500 Materials peers) | 100% | 3-year performance period; cliff vest on 3rd anniversary | 2025 program shifted to 100% PSUs for executive officers; sole metric is relative TSR |
| Prior PSP (2022–2024) – Company result | 3-yr Adjusted ROIC | 50% | 3-year | Achieved 63.75% of target |
| Relative TSR | 50% | 3-year | Achieved 200% of target; total PSP payout 131.88% |
Mr. Loeffler – Award grants and vesting
| Award | Grant value/size | Grant/Performance dates | Vesting/settlement terms |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 Inducement RSU | $1,700,000 | Granted shortly after start; number based on prior-day close | Vests ratably over 3 years starting on 1st anniversary; full vest on involuntary termination without cause/for good reason, death or disability |
| 2025 LTIP PSU (target) | $3,500,000 | 2025 grant; number based on 20-trading-day average and Monte Carlo factor | Eligible to vest on 3rd anniversary subject to relative TSR performance; pro-rata vest provisions on qualifying separation per plan |
| 2025 “Top Off” PSU (target) | 15,916 PSUs | Award date Aug 5, 2025; performance period Jan 1, 2025–Dec 31, 2027 | Payout based 100% on relative TSR; paid in stock post-performance period; dividend equivalents accrue as PSUs |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Policy/holding dimension | Status/requirement |
|---|---|
| Officer stock ownership guideline | Senior Vice President requirement: 3× base salary; retain 50% of after-tax equity payouts until met |
| Hedging/pledging | Strictly prohibited for officers/directors |
| Clawback | Mandatory clawback for current/former executive officers upon a restatement; clawback/forfeiture also tied to non-compete/non-solicit violations |
| Share retention | 50% after-tax retention until ownership guideline is met |
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail |
|---|---|
| Start date | CFO effective April 1, 2025 |
| Employment | At-will |
| Non-compete / non-solicit | Required as a condition of employment |
| Severance (non-CIC) | Lump sum 1.5× (base salary + target AIP); pro‑rata AIP based on actual performance; 18 months health & welfare benefits; 12 months outplacement; equity: pro‑rata PSUs (subject to performance), RSUs vest in full |
| Change-in-control (double trigger, within 2 years) | 2× (base salary + target AIP); 24 months health & welfare; outplacement; equity treated per plan terms |
| Taxes/gross‑ups | No tax gross‑ups under company policy; health benefit continuity paid without gross‑up if ineligible to provide under plans |
Performance & Track Record
- Background execution credentials: former EVP & CFO at Halliburton and regional SVP MENA, plus prior capital markets roles (DB/UBS), indicating depth across FP&A, investor relations, corporate development, and operating P&L oversight .
- Company pay-for-performance footing: 2024 AIP paid at 179.1% (driven by EBITDA and cash conversion), and the 2022–2024 PSP paid at 131.88% (strong relative TSR offset by lower ROIC), framing the incentive architecture Mr. Loeffler now oversees as CFO .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Related-party/Item 404: Appointment filings note no related‑party transactions and no family relationships tied to his selection .
- Anti-hedging/pledging and clawback provisions reduce alignment risk; executive ownership and retention policies reinforce shareholder alignment .
Compensation Committee, Say‑on‑Pay, and Peer Practices
- 2025 overhaul actions: shifted LTIP to 100% PSUs (relative TSR) and restructured STI for business-unit accountability; adopted an Executive Severance Plan to align with shareholder feedback .
- Say‑on‑Pay support: ~96% approval in May 2024, evidencing investor backing for the program’s architecture .
- Peer benchmarking: compensation design references proxy peers and survey medians; CEO/ELT target positioning around median; relative TSR peer set drawn from S&P 1500 Materials (highest stock correlation constituents) for PSU measurement .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: The mix of 100% performance-based LTIP (relative TSR) plus meaningful equity (PSUs and inducement RSUs) with multi‑year vesting creates strong alignment and predictable retention milestones; double‑trigger CIC at 2× and non‑CIC severance at 1.5× are within market, limiting parachute risk while preserving recruitment competitiveness .
- Near-term selling pressure watchpoints: Annual RSU tranche vesting will begin on the first anniversary of the 2025 inducement grant, and PSUs settle after the 2025–2027 performance period; tax‑withholding transactions are typical at these events, but insider selling risk is mitigated by strict anti‑hedging/pledging and ownership/retention requirements .
- Execution lens: Prior CFO/operating experience in cyclical, capital‑intensive industries should aid integration of DS Smith and delivery against IP’s 80/20 system and TSR‑based LTIP; investors should track 2025–2027 TSR rank, AIP metric attainment post‑design change, and any incremental equity “top‑off” actions like the August 2025 PSU adjustment (15,916 target) for momentum and dilution signals .