Marianne Lake
About Marianne Lake
Marianne Lake is CEO of Consumer & Community Banking (CCB) at JPMorgan Chase and a member of the Operating Committee; she became sole CEO of CCB in January 2024 after serving as Co‑CEO since May 2021 and previously CFO of JPMorgan Chase from 2013–2019 . She holds a B.Sc. in Physics from the University of Reading and trained as a Chartered Accountant at PwC in London and Sydney . Born in 1969 (approx. age 56), Lake has dual U.S./UK background and joined JPMorgan in 1999 . Under her leadership influence, CCB delivered strong results: in 2023 (performance-year 2023) CCB generated $21.2B net income on $70.1B revenue with 38% ROE , and in 2024 the Firm reported record results with $180.6B managed revenue, $58.5B net income, ROE 18% and ROTCE 22% .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| JPMorgan Chase | CEO, Consumer & Community Banking | Jan 2024–present | Leads CCB serving >85M consumers/7M small businesses; oversees International Consumer Banking |
| JPMorgan Chase | Co‑CEO, Consumer & Community Banking | May 2021–Dec 2023 | Co-led CCB through expansion/integration, including First Republic consumer integration progress |
| JPMorgan Chase | CEO, Consumer Lending | 2019–Apr 2021 | Led Card, Home Lending, Auto; built payments/lending scale within CCB |
| JPMorgan Chase | Chief Financial Officer (Firm) | 2013–2019 | Oversaw Firm finance, IR, CIO, Chief Data Office, CAO; CCAR/Resolution plan leadership |
| JPMorgan Chase | CFO, Consumer & Community Banking | 2009–2012 | Business CFO for CCB |
| JPMorgan Chase | Global Controller, Investment Bank | 2007–2009 | Strengthened controls/reporting for IB |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| PwC (London & Sydney) | Chartered Accountant (training) | Pre‑1999 | Built accounting/controls foundation prior to joining JPM |
Fixed Compensation
| Year (performance-year) | Base salary ($) |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 750,000 |
| 2023 | 750,000 |
Performance Compensation
| Year (performance-year) | Cash incentive ($) | RSUs grant-date FV ($) | PSUs grant-date FV ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 6,700,000 | 5,025,000 | 5,025,000 | 17,500,000 |
| 2023 | 7,100,000 | 5,325,000 | 5,325,000 | 18,500,000 |
- PSU design and vesting: 3‑year performance period with 0–150% payout based on average absolute ROTCE and relative ROTCE vs peers; 2‑year post‑vest hold for U.S. OC members .
- RSU vesting: generally 50% at ~2 years and 50% at ~3 years; dividend equivalents paid in cash; no voting rights .
- 2023 grant specifics (awarded Jan 17, 2023): RSUs 35,796 ($5.025M) and target PSUs 35,796 ($5.025M) to Lake .
- 2022 grant specifics (awarded Jan 18, 2022): RSUs 30,851 ($4.725M) and target PSUs 30,851 ($4.725M) .
2023 and 2022 Equity Grant Details
| Grant date | Instrument | Units (#) | Grant-date fair value ($) | Vesting/Holding |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/17/2023 | RSUs | 35,796 | 5,025,000 | 50% 1/13/2025; 50% 1/13/2026; cash dividend equivalents |
| 1/17/2023 | PSUs (target) | 35,796 | 5,025,000 | Cliff vests 3/25/2026; 2‑yr post‑vest hold; 0–150% payout on 3‑yr avg ROTCE |
| 1/18/2022 | RSUs | 30,851 | 4,725,000 | 50% 1/13/2024; 50% 1/13/2025; cash dividend equivalents |
| 1/18/2022 | PSUs (target) | 30,851 | 4,725,000 | Cliff 3/25/2025; 2‑yr hold; 0–150% payout on 3‑yr avg ROTCE |
CCB Performance Context (assessment drivers)
| Metric | 2023 result | Source |
|---|---|---|
| CCB Revenue ($B) | 70.1 | |
| CCB Net income ($B) | 21.2 | |
| CCB ROE (%) | 38% | |
| Customers | >82M consumers; 6.4M small businesses | |
| Strategic | #1 U.S. retail deposit market share; #1 U.S. credit card issuer by sales/outstandings |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| As of | Common stock owned (#) | Additional underlying stock units (#) | Total counted units (#) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Feb 28, 2023 | 212,100 | 219,384 | 431,484 |
| Outstanding (unvested) equity at 12/31/2022 | RSUs not yet vested (#) | PSUs unearned/not vested (#) |
|---|---|---|
| Lake | 131,006 | 98,172 |
- Stock ownership guidelines for Operating Committee (OC): must accumulate 200,000–400,000 shares or $10–$30M in value within six years; retain 75% of net shares until guideline met, then 50% thereafter (75% for CEO) .
- Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: OC members are prohibited from hedging and from pledging shares held directly; unvested awards cannot be hedged/pledged .
- Rule 10b5‑1 trading plans: Lake (via trust) adopted plans to sell 50% of net shares from RSU vests during designated windows (Aug 4, 2023 plan for Jan 13, 2024 vests; Aug 13, 2025 plan for Jan 13, 2026 vests), indicating pre‑programmed sales around vest dates .
Employment Terms
| Topic | Key terms |
|---|---|
| Employment agreement | No special executive employment contract disclosed; Firm avoids “golden parachute” agreements . |
| Severance | Broad‑based plan applies; Lake’s modeled “Severance and other” for involuntary termination (2023 table) = $348,288 . |
| Equity on exit | Full‑career eligibility provisions allow continued vesting on original schedule for resignations meeting criteria, subject to post‑employment restrictions (e.g., not working in financial services) . |
| Change‑in‑control | No special payments; NEOs are not entitled to additional equity grants upon a CIC; firm policy “No golden parachute agreements” . |
| Clawbacks | Strong clawback provisions enabling cancellation, reduction or repayment where appropriate . |
| Non‑compete/Non‑solicit | Post‑employment obligations embedded via full‑career eligibility conditions (continued vesting subject to restrictions) . |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Prohibited for OC/directors as noted above . |
Potential Payments upon Termination (as of 12/31/2023; select scenarios)
| Scenario | Severance & other ($) | RSUs ($) | PSUs ($) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary without cause | 348,288 | 14,075,775 | 20,630,400 |
| Disability | — | 14,075,775 | 23,511,333 |
| Death | — | 14,075,775 | — |
| Resignation (Full‑Career eligibility) | — | 14,075,775 | 20,630,400 |
Note: “Severance & other” under involuntary without cause reflects broad‑based plan formula; no additional CIC cash severance is provided .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Cash vs equity mix trending to equity: For 2022–2023, ~57–62% of Lake’s incentive was equity (RSUs/PSUs split 50/50), aligning with Firm’s standard mix for U.S. OC (60% equity, half PSUs) .
- Performance leverage via PSUs: At‑risk PSUs (0–150%) tied to absolute and relative ROTCE over three years, with two‑year hold; encourages multi‑year value creation and capital discipline .
- Strong governance: No golden parachutes, robust clawbacks, anti‑hedging/pledging; majority of variable pay deferred .
- Peer benchmarking: CMDC references a primary financial services peer group (AXP, BAC, C, GS, MS, WFC) for market context, without targeting a percentile .
Say‑on‑Pay, Shareholder Feedback, and Peer Group
- Say‑on‑Pay support: 91% approval at 2024 annual meeting (covering 2023 compensation decisions) .
- Engagement: ~255 shareholder/stakeholder engagements in 2024 covering succession, compensation, risk, and sustainability; directors participated as appropriate .
- Compensation peer group: American Express, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo .
Performance & Track Record
| Measure | Firm/LOB performance highlights |
|---|---|
| Firm 2024 | Managed revenue $180.6B; reported revenue $177.6B; net income $58.5B; ROE 18%; ROTCE 22% . |
| CCB 2023 | Revenue $70.1B; net income $21.2B; ROE 38%; #1 U.S. retail deposit share; #1 U.S. card issuer by sales/outstandings . |
| CCB 2024 | Revenue $71.5B; net income $17.6B; ROE 32% . |
| Long‑term alignment | Board cites strong multi‑year ROTCE/TSR leadership and size/scale advantages as context for executive pay . |
Expertise & Qualifications
- Education: B.Sc. Physics, University of Reading; Chartered Accountant (ICAEW) via PwC .
- Roles across finance and operations (CFO → Consumer Lending → CCB CEO) with deep experience in capital, CCAR, controls, and large‑scale retail banking .
- Succession relevance: Board highlights Operating Committee development with Lake continuing as CCB CEO; external reports frequently list her among CEO succession contenders .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: High deferred equity (RSUs/PSUs) with 3‑year PSU performance and 2‑year hold, stringent clawbacks, and anti‑hedging/pledging policies create strong alignment and reduce risk of opportunistic behavior; full‑career vesting conditions impose non‑compete‑like effects post‑employment .
- Potential selling pressure: Pre‑scheduled 10b5‑1 plans to sell portions of net RSU vests around mid‑January could create small, predictable insider supply windows; however, these are programmatic and tax‑/liquidity‑driven .
- Pay-for-performance linkage: Lake’s incentive mix (50% PSUs) ties outcomes to ROTCE, benefiting shareholders if ROTCE remains peer‑leading; downside protected via 0% floor on PSUs if performance deteriorates .
- Execution track record: CCB’s scale, share leadership and profitability under her leadership provide support for continued value creation; Firm‑level records in 2024 reinforce compensation alignment narrative .