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Marianne Lake

CEO, Consumer & Community Banking at JPMORGAN CHASE &JPMORGAN CHASE &
Executive

About Marianne Lake

Marianne Lake is CEO of Consumer & Community Banking (CCB) at JPMorgan Chase and a member of the Operating Committee; she became sole CEO of CCB in January 2024 after serving as Co‑CEO since May 2021 and previously CFO of JPMorgan Chase from 2013–2019 . She holds a B.Sc. in Physics from the University of Reading and trained as a Chartered Accountant at PwC in London and Sydney . Born in 1969 (approx. age 56), Lake has dual U.S./UK background and joined JPMorgan in 1999 . Under her leadership influence, CCB delivered strong results: in 2023 (performance-year 2023) CCB generated $21.2B net income on $70.1B revenue with 38% ROE , and in 2024 the Firm reported record results with $180.6B managed revenue, $58.5B net income, ROE 18% and ROTCE 22% .

Past Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
JPMorgan ChaseCEO, Consumer & Community BankingJan 2024–presentLeads CCB serving >85M consumers/7M small businesses; oversees International Consumer Banking
JPMorgan ChaseCo‑CEO, Consumer & Community BankingMay 2021–Dec 2023Co-led CCB through expansion/integration, including First Republic consumer integration progress
JPMorgan ChaseCEO, Consumer Lending2019–Apr 2021Led Card, Home Lending, Auto; built payments/lending scale within CCB
JPMorgan ChaseChief Financial Officer (Firm)2013–2019Oversaw Firm finance, IR, CIO, Chief Data Office, CAO; CCAR/Resolution plan leadership
JPMorgan ChaseCFO, Consumer & Community Banking2009–2012Business CFO for CCB
JPMorgan ChaseGlobal Controller, Investment Bank2007–2009Strengthened controls/reporting for IB

External Roles

OrganizationRoleYearsStrategic impact
PwC (London & Sydney)Chartered Accountant (training)Pre‑1999Built accounting/controls foundation prior to joining JPM

Fixed Compensation

Year (performance-year)Base salary ($)
2022750,000
2023750,000

Performance Compensation

Year (performance-year)Cash incentive ($)RSUs grant-date FV ($)PSUs grant-date FV ($)Total ($)
20226,700,000 5,025,000 5,025,000 17,500,000
20237,100,000 5,325,000 5,325,000 18,500,000
  • PSU design and vesting: 3‑year performance period with 0–150% payout based on average absolute ROTCE and relative ROTCE vs peers; 2‑year post‑vest hold for U.S. OC members .
  • RSU vesting: generally 50% at ~2 years and 50% at ~3 years; dividend equivalents paid in cash; no voting rights .
  • 2023 grant specifics (awarded Jan 17, 2023): RSUs 35,796 ($5.025M) and target PSUs 35,796 ($5.025M) to Lake .
  • 2022 grant specifics (awarded Jan 18, 2022): RSUs 30,851 ($4.725M) and target PSUs 30,851 ($4.725M) .

2023 and 2022 Equity Grant Details

Grant dateInstrumentUnits (#)Grant-date fair value ($)Vesting/Holding
1/17/2023RSUs35,796 5,025,000 50% 1/13/2025; 50% 1/13/2026; cash dividend equivalents
1/17/2023PSUs (target)35,796 5,025,000 Cliff vests 3/25/2026; 2‑yr post‑vest hold; 0–150% payout on 3‑yr avg ROTCE
1/18/2022RSUs30,851 4,725,000 50% 1/13/2024; 50% 1/13/2025; cash dividend equivalents
1/18/2022PSUs (target)30,851 4,725,000 Cliff 3/25/2025; 2‑yr hold; 0–150% payout on 3‑yr avg ROTCE

CCB Performance Context (assessment drivers)

Metric2023 resultSource
CCB Revenue ($B)70.1
CCB Net income ($B)21.2
CCB ROE (%)38%
Customers>82M consumers; 6.4M small businesses
Strategic#1 U.S. retail deposit market share; #1 U.S. credit card issuer by sales/outstandings

Equity Ownership & Alignment

As ofCommon stock owned (#)Additional underlying stock units (#)Total counted units (#)
Feb 28, 2023212,100 219,384 431,484
Outstanding (unvested) equity at 12/31/2022RSUs not yet vested (#)PSUs unearned/not vested (#)
Lake131,006 98,172
  • Stock ownership guidelines for Operating Committee (OC): must accumulate 200,000–400,000 shares or $10–$30M in value within six years; retain 75% of net shares until guideline met, then 50% thereafter (75% for CEO) .
  • Anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging: OC members are prohibited from hedging and from pledging shares held directly; unvested awards cannot be hedged/pledged .
  • Rule 10b5‑1 trading plans: Lake (via trust) adopted plans to sell 50% of net shares from RSU vests during designated windows (Aug 4, 2023 plan for Jan 13, 2024 vests; Aug 13, 2025 plan for Jan 13, 2026 vests), indicating pre‑programmed sales around vest dates .

Employment Terms

TopicKey terms
Employment agreementNo special executive employment contract disclosed; Firm avoids “golden parachute” agreements .
SeveranceBroad‑based plan applies; Lake’s modeled “Severance and other” for involuntary termination (2023 table) = $348,288 .
Equity on exitFull‑career eligibility provisions allow continued vesting on original schedule for resignations meeting criteria, subject to post‑employment restrictions (e.g., not working in financial services) .
Change‑in‑controlNo special payments; NEOs are not entitled to additional equity grants upon a CIC; firm policy “No golden parachute agreements” .
ClawbacksStrong clawback provisions enabling cancellation, reduction or repayment where appropriate .
Non‑compete/Non‑solicitPost‑employment obligations embedded via full‑career eligibility conditions (continued vesting subject to restrictions) .
Anti‑hedging/pledgingProhibited for OC/directors as noted above .

Potential Payments upon Termination (as of 12/31/2023; select scenarios)

ScenarioSeverance & other ($)RSUs ($)PSUs ($)
Involuntary without cause348,288 14,075,775 20,630,400
Disability14,075,775 23,511,333
Death14,075,775
Resignation (Full‑Career eligibility)14,075,775 20,630,400

Note: “Severance & other” under involuntary without cause reflects broad‑based plan formula; no additional CIC cash severance is provided .

Compensation Structure Analysis

  • Cash vs equity mix trending to equity: For 2022–2023, ~57–62% of Lake’s incentive was equity (RSUs/PSUs split 50/50), aligning with Firm’s standard mix for U.S. OC (60% equity, half PSUs) .
  • Performance leverage via PSUs: At‑risk PSUs (0–150%) tied to absolute and relative ROTCE over three years, with two‑year hold; encourages multi‑year value creation and capital discipline .
  • Strong governance: No golden parachutes, robust clawbacks, anti‑hedging/pledging; majority of variable pay deferred .
  • Peer benchmarking: CMDC references a primary financial services peer group (AXP, BAC, C, GS, MS, WFC) for market context, without targeting a percentile .

Say‑on‑Pay, Shareholder Feedback, and Peer Group

  • Say‑on‑Pay support: 91% approval at 2024 annual meeting (covering 2023 compensation decisions) .
  • Engagement: ~255 shareholder/stakeholder engagements in 2024 covering succession, compensation, risk, and sustainability; directors participated as appropriate .
  • Compensation peer group: American Express, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Wells Fargo .

Performance & Track Record

MeasureFirm/LOB performance highlights
Firm 2024Managed revenue $180.6B; reported revenue $177.6B; net income $58.5B; ROE 18%; ROTCE 22% .
CCB 2023Revenue $70.1B; net income $21.2B; ROE 38%; #1 U.S. retail deposit share; #1 U.S. card issuer by sales/outstandings .
CCB 2024Revenue $71.5B; net income $17.6B; ROE 32% .
Long‑term alignmentBoard cites strong multi‑year ROTCE/TSR leadership and size/scale advantages as context for executive pay .

Expertise & Qualifications

  • Education: B.Sc. Physics, University of Reading; Chartered Accountant (ICAEW) via PwC .
  • Roles across finance and operations (CFO → Consumer Lending → CCB CEO) with deep experience in capital, CCAR, controls, and large‑scale retail banking .
  • Succession relevance: Board highlights Operating Committee development with Lake continuing as CCB CEO; external reports frequently list her among CEO succession contenders .

Investment Implications

  • Alignment and retention: High deferred equity (RSUs/PSUs) with 3‑year PSU performance and 2‑year hold, stringent clawbacks, and anti‑hedging/pledging policies create strong alignment and reduce risk of opportunistic behavior; full‑career vesting conditions impose non‑compete‑like effects post‑employment .
  • Potential selling pressure: Pre‑scheduled 10b5‑1 plans to sell portions of net RSU vests around mid‑January could create small, predictable insider supply windows; however, these are programmatic and tax‑/liquidity‑driven .
  • Pay-for-performance linkage: Lake’s incentive mix (50% PSUs) ties outcomes to ROTCE, benefiting shareholders if ROTCE remains peer‑leading; downside protected via 0% floor on PSUs if performance deteriorates .
  • Execution track record: CCB’s scale, share leadership and profitability under her leadership provide support for continued value creation; Firm‑level records in 2024 reinforce compensation alignment narrative .