Evan Scott
LOCKHEED MARTINAbout Evan Scott
Evan T. Scott is Lockheed Martin’s Chief Financial Officer, appointed effective April 17, 2025; he is 48 and a 26‑year company veteran with deep finance leadership experience across business segments and corporate treasury . Lockheed Martin’s incentive programs emphasize pay-for-performance with metrics including Relative TSR, Free Cash Flow, ROIC, Segment Operating Profit, Sales, and strategic goals . Company performance context: 2024 sales were $71.0B (+5% YoY), segment operating profit $6.1B, free cash flow $5.3B, and backlog $176.0B, underpinning compensation outcomes and value creation .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lockheed Martin | CFO, Missiles and Fire Control (MFC) | 2024–2025 | Led segment finance and operations as elected officer |
| Lockheed Martin | Vice President & Treasurer | 2022–2023 | Corporate treasury leadership; liquidity, capital markets, and risk management |
| Lockheed Martin | VP, Finance & Business Operations, Space | 2019–2021 | Finance leadership for Space segment business operations |
| Lockheed Martin | VP & Controller, Missiles and Fire Control | 2015–2019 | Segment controllership; financial reporting and controls |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| — | — | — | No external public company directorships disclosed in SEC filings reviewed |
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Terms | Effective date |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary ($) | $850,000 | April 21, 2025 |
| Target annual incentive (%) | 125% of base salary under the Management Incentive Compensation Plan | April 21, 2025 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (enterprise-level design)
| Metric | Weighting | Target definition | Actual/Payout status | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sales | 20% of financial component (within 70% total financial weighting) | Company-set annual target (not disclosed) | 2025 payout not yet disclosed | Financial goals aggregate to 70%: Sales, Segment Operating Profit, Free Cash Flow |
| Segment Operating Profit | 40% of financial component | Company-set annual target (not disclosed) | 2025 payout not yet disclosed | Non-GAAP definitions in Appendix A |
| Free Cash Flow | 40% of financial component | Company-set annual target (not disclosed) | 2025 payout not yet disclosed | Non-GAAP definitions in Appendix A |
| Strategic & Operational goals | 30% overall | Enterprise key goals (e.g., growth, strategy, responsible business) (not disclosed in detail) | 2025 payout not yet disclosed | Committee retains discretion; caps at 200% target |
Long‑Term Incentives (design and Scott’s current equity)
| Instrument | Metric | Weighting | Vesting | Granted/held | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (program design) | Relative TSR | 50% | 3‑year performance cycle | Program design applies to executives | TSR capped at 100% if negative |
| PSUs (program design) | Free Cash Flow | 25% | 3‑year performance cycle | Program design applies to executives | Non‑GAAP definitions in Appendix A |
| PSUs (program design) | ROIC | 25% | 3‑year performance cycle | Program design applies to executives | Non‑GAAP definitions in Appendix A |
| RSUs (Scott) | Time‑based | — | 3‑year cliff; vests 02/22/2026 (886 sh), 02/22/2027 (990 sh), 02/26/2028 (962 sh) | 886; 990; 962 | Each RSU equals one LMT share |
| LTI eligibility (Scott) | LTIP award for CFO role | — | Next grant in 2026 (subject to Committee approval) | — | Compensation aligned to market comparator group |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Category | Amount | Form | Detail |
|---|---|---|---|
| Common stock (direct) | 382.826 sh | Direct | As reported on Form 3 (filed 04/25/2025) |
| Common stock (indirect, 401k) | 502.6929 sh | Indirect | Lockheed Martin Salaried Savings Plan |
| RSUs (unvested) | 2,838 sh total | Derivative | 886 (02/22/2026); 990 (02/22/2027); 962 (02/26/2028) |
| Phantom stock units (SSP) | 179.5842 units | Indirect | Settle in cash at retirement/termination (1:1 to common) |
| Ownership guidelines | 4x base salary for CFO | Policy | Achieve within five years; hold net shares from vesting until threshold met |
| Hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors/officers/employees | Policy | Ban includes swaps, collars, forwards, exchange funds |
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Employment agreement | None (company policy; no individual CIC agreements) | Scott’s CFO comp set to market rate; governance best practice |
| Severance (Executive Severance Plan) | Lump sum: 1× base salary + 1× target annual incentive (CEO 2.99×) | Plus 1‑year benefits coverage; outplacement/relocation |
| Change‑in‑control (CIC) | Double trigger for LTI acceleration; non‑qualified pension/deferral accelerated on CIC; substitute awards required to avoid acceleration | No CIC gross‑ups; no enhanced pension inclusion of LTI |
| Clawbacks | Policy on Recovery of Incentive‑Based Compensation; supplemental discretionary clawback on variable pay | Administered by Compensation Committee |
| Non‑compete / non‑solicit | Required via severance plan/LTI agreements (post‑employment covenants) | Must execute release and covenants to receive severance |
| Perquisites | Executive physicals, relocation (as applicable), personal use of corporate aircraft, home/personal security | Security program overseen by CBS Committee given threat environment |
| Ownership/holding | Must hold net RSU/PSU shares until guideline met; unvested PSUs don’t count to threshold | CFO guideline 4× salary |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Strict prohibition | Alignment safeguard |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance alignment is strong: annual incentives tied to Sales/Segment Operating Profit/Free Cash Flow, and LTI linked to Relative TSR, FCF, and ROIC, creating direct sensitivity to cash generation and capital efficiency that matter for defense primes’ valuation and FCF yield .
- Near‑term vesting calendar shows RSU cliffs in Feb 2026/2027/2028, which can create episodic selling windows; however, holding requirements until the 4× salary ownership threshold and a ban on hedging/pledging mitigate forced‑sale pressure and support alignment .
- Retention risk appears contained by the severance framework, clawbacks, and forthcoming 2026 LTI grant sized for the CFO role; absence of employment agreements and no CIC gross‑ups reflects shareholder‑friendly governance without weakening incentive efficacy .
- Company fundamentals underpin incentive attainment: 2024 sales growth (+5%), $176B record backlog, and $5.3B FCF support cash‑ and TSR‑linked payouts; say‑on‑pay support (93% in 2024) indicates investors view the pay model as appropriately structured .