Aaron Webster
About Aaron Webster
Executive Vice President and Global Chief Risk Officer at PayPal since March 2024 (age 45). Previously Chief Risk Officer at SoFi and Citi; led risk management and data science at Toyota; earlier roles at GE Capital . Chairs PayPal’s Enterprise Risk Management Committee and reports regularly to the Board’s ARC Committee on risk, compliance, cybersecurity, privacy, AI and internal controls . Company performance backdrop in 2024: net revenues grew 7% to $31.8B, non‑GAAP operating income rose to $5.8B, cash from operations was $7.5B and free cash flow $6.8B; branded checkout MAUs grew to 142M and TPV reached $1.68T (+10% YoY), forming the basis for 2024 incentive outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| SoFi | Chief Risk Officer; later Global Head of Operations and Latin America | 2019–2024 | Built enterprise risk and operations capability at a high-growth fintech; strengthened risk governance across lending and consumer platforms . |
| Citi | Chief Risk Officer | 2018–2019 | Led risk management for a major global bank division; enhanced regulatory compliance and portfolio risk oversight . |
| Toyota North America | Managing Director, Risk Management & Data Science (Americas) | 2016–2018 | Advanced data-driven risk models for residual value and regional operations; improved risk analytics and capital efficiency . |
| Toyota North America | Director/Managing Director, Risk Management & Data Science (Americas/US Residual Value) | 2008–2016 | Built risk and data science functions; supported product financing strategies . |
| GE Capital | Regional Risk Leader | 2004–2008 | Managed regional credit risk; implemented risk frameworks across portfolios . |
External Roles
None disclosed (no public company directorships listed for Webster) .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | 2024 Target | 2024 Actuals | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | 750,000 | 591,781 (prorated from March 18 start) | Start date March 18, 2024 . |
| Target Annual Bonus (% of Salary) | 125% | See AIP payout below | AIP metrics company-weighted; individual modifier 100% . |
| Cash Sign-on Bonus ($) | 2,500,000 | 2,500,000 paid in 2024 | Repayment: 100% if resign/terminated for cause within 12 months; declining obligation through month 24 . |
| Make-Whole RSUs ($) | 4,000,000 | Granted in 2024 (see grants table) | 50% standard 3-year vest; 50% vest at first anniversary . |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) — 2024
| Metric | Weight | Threshold (50% payout) | Target (100%) | Max (200%) | Actual | Company Performance Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction Margin Dollars ($B) | 50% | 13.600 | 13.950 | 14.400 | 14.658 | 200% |
| Non-GAAP Operating Income ($B) | 50% | 5.000 | 5.400 | 5.850 | 5.838 | 197% |
| Company Performance Score | — | — | — | — | — | 199% |
Individual performance score: 100% for all NEOs . Webster AIP payout: $1,473,130 on a prorated target of $740,266 (company 199%, individual 100%) .
Long-Term Incentive (LTI) — 2024 Grants and Design
| Element | Metric | Weight | Target / Structure | Actual to Date | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PBRSUs | Relative TSR vs S&P 500 (target at 55th percentile) | 50% of LTI | Target grant value $4.5M; 70,808 target shares | 12-month period achieved 84th percentile; one-third of PBRSUs will vest at 200% of target subject to 36-month cap if absolute TSR negative | 3-year cliff vest (no vest before end); measures at 12, 24, 36 months; final vest 3/1/2027 . |
| RSUs (service-based) | Stock price | 50% of LTI | Target grant value $4.5M; 70,808 shares | N/A | One-third vests on first anniversary of grant; remainder vests quarterly thereafter over 3 years . |
| Make-Whole One-Year RSUs | Stock price | — | 31,470 shares (one-year tranche) | N/A | 100% vest on first anniversary of grant . |
| Make-Whole Supplemental RSUs | Stock price | — | 31,470 shares (3-year service-based) | N/A | One-third on first anniversary; quarterly thereafter over 3 years . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total Beneficial Ownership | 65,565 shares; less than 1% of outstanding . |
| Options | None held in 2024; no exercises . |
| Unvested RSUs (12/31/2024) | 70,808 (3-year service-based), 31,470 (3-year supplemental), 31,470 (one-year tranche); market values $6.04M, $2.69M, $2.69M at $85.35/sh . |
| Unearned PBRSUs (12/31/2024) | 141,616 target–max range; payout based on rTSR over 12/24/36 months; market/payout value shown at plan assumptions . |
| Upcoming Vesting Milestones | First-anniversary vest for grants dated 4/15/2024 occurs 4/15/2025: one-third of 70,808 RSUs; 100% of 31,470 one-year RSUs; plus quarterly vesting thereafter per plan . |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | EVPs required to hold 3x base salary; 5-year compliance window; retain 25% of net shares until compliant; NEOs are on track . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Prohibited for executive officers; no pledging of PayPal stock; hedging and monetization transactions banned . |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Outside CIC | Within CIC Period | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash Severance | 1.0x base + target bonus (lump sum) for EVPs | 2.0x base + target bonus (lump sum) | CIC period: 90 days pre- to 24 months post-CIC . |
| COBRA | Up to 12 months company-paid/reimbursed | 24 months lump sum of COBRA premiums | — |
| Bonus Treatment | Earned but unpaid prior-year AIP paid; no prorated current-year bonus (non-CEO) | Included in lump sum multiple; no single-trigger payments | — |
| Equity – Time-Based | Continue vesting for awards vesting within 12 months post-termination (outside CIC) | If awards not assumed in CIC, they accelerate; otherwise continue time-based per original schedule after performance deemed earned as of CIC date | Equity Plan governs CIC treatment . |
| Equity – Performance-Based | Continue vesting for awards with performance period ending within 12 months post-termination, based solely on Company performance | Performance period ends at CIC; earned portion continues to vest time-based; if not assumed, accelerate at CIC | — |
| Triggers & Gross-ups | Double-trigger only; no excise tax gross-ups; eliminated “good reason” outside CIC for non-CEO executives | Double-trigger; no single-trigger acceleration unless awards not assumed | — |
| Clawbacks | Mandatory recovery policy under SEC/Nasdaq; supplemental clawback for misconduct, harm, or supervisory failure; covers cash and equity (incl. time-based) | Applies equally in CIC contexts | — |
Investment Implications
- Strong pay-for-performance alignment: AIP metrics tied to transaction margin dollars and non-GAAP operating income delivered a 199% company score, while LTI uses rTSR vs S&P 500 with three discrete periods and a 36‑month negative TSR cap—reducing windfall risk and emphasizing durable value creation .
- Retention and potential selling pressure: Significant 4/15/2025 first-anniversary vest events across RSU tranches (including a one‑year make‑whole RSU) and ongoing quarterly vesting thereafter may incrementally increase insider sale capacity; ownership guidelines require retention of 25% of net shares until compliant, partially mitigating near-term selling .
- Risk oversight competency: As Global CRO and ERM Committee chair, Webster is central to managing regulatory, cybersecurity, privacy, AI, operational, capital, and reputational risks—key execution levers for PayPal’s multijurisdictional payments platform .
- Governance and shareholder-friendliness: No single-trigger CIC benefits, no excise tax gross-ups, robust clawbacks, and strict anti-hedging/pledging policies support alignment and reduce governance red flags; 2024 say‑on‑pay support was 83% .
Overall, Webster’s compensation mix (cash AIP + rTSR‑based PBRSUs + service RSUs) and stock ownership rules indicate high alignment with profitable growth and shareholder returns, with retention secured through multi-year vesting and double-trigger CIC protection .