Amy Rawlings
RobloxAbout Amy Rawlings
Amy Rawlings is Chief Accounting Officer (CAO) at Roblox (RBLX), serving since July 2022. She is 40 years old as of April 1, 2025, holds a BA in Business Economics (Accounting emphasis) from the University of California, Santa Barbara, and is a Certified Public Accountant in California. Prior roles include CAO at Zynga and leadership in controllership, SEC reporting, and revenue accounting; earlier she worked at Ernst & Young (2006–2010) . Company performance metrics incorporated into executive incentives emphasize Bookings and Covenant Adjusted EBITDA in 2024 PSU design (0–200% payout over a two‑year period), aligning pay with operational outcomes .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zynga Inc. | Chief Accounting Officer | Aug 2021 – Jul 2022 | Led U.S. and international accounting operations; SEC reporting and revenue accounting |
| Zynga Inc. | Accounting leadership (Controllership, SEC Reporting, Revenue Accounting) | ~2009–2021 (12 years) | IPO readiness, SOX implementation, accounting standards adoption, financial statement preparation, global revenue recognition |
| Ernst & Young | Assurance/Accounting | 2006 – 2010 | Foundation in audit/accounting practices |
External Roles
No external public company directorships or committee roles disclosed for Rawlings in RBLX’s proxy materials .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | $500,000 annual wage (paid semi‑monthly) | |
| Initial equity grant (RSUs) | $3,000,000 grant value; share count determined by 20‑day average closing price; vesting per Board‑approved schedule under 2020 Plan | |
| Equity refresh eligibility | Eligible to receive quarterly equity refresh starting 5th quarter from hire (Jan/Apr/Jul/Oct grant cycle; terms at LDCC discretion) | |
| Benefits | Health plan; 401(k) with match: 100% of first 3% + 50% of next 2% of salary | |
| Employment status | At‑will; arbitration agreement required; confidentiality and invention assignment |
Performance Compensation
| Incentive type | Metric | Target/Weighting | Payout mechanics | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company PSU program (2024) | Cumulative Bookings; Covenant Adjusted EBITDA | Not disclosed for Rawlings | 0–200% of target based on two‑year performance (FY2024–FY2025); certification post‑period | 67% vests at certification; 33% vests quarterly over 1 year starting May 2026 (exec program design) |
| RSUs (post-direct listing practice) | Service-based | Not disclosed for Rawlings | Time-based | Grants in/after July 2022 generally vest over 3 years (company practice) |
Notes:
- No Rawlings‑specific annual bonus target %, actual bonus paid, PSU targets/actuals, or option awards are disclosed in filings. Her initial compensation is predominantly fixed cash plus RSUs, with refresh eligibility . Company programs prohibit hedging/pledging, use double‑trigger CIC arrangements, and maintain stock ownership requirements for executive officers .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | Not specifically disclosed for Rawlings in 2025 proxy tables | |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Robust guidelines apply to all executive officers; no hedging or pledging | |
| Clawback policy | Compensation Recovery Policy filed as Exhibit 97.1 (Feb 21, 2024) | |
| Insider trading plans (Rule 10b5‑1) | Adopted Aug 28, 2023 for sale up to 40,928 shares; expires Sep 30, 2024 . Terminated May 28, 2024; adopted May 29, 2024 for sale up to 49,138 shares; expires Jun 2, 2025 . Terminated Feb 27, 2025; adopted Feb 27, 2025 for sale up to 25,020 shares; expires Mar 2, 2026 . Terminated Jun 3, 2025 . | |
| Pledging/Hedging | Prohibited for directors and employees |
Insider selling pressure commentary:
- Multiple pre‑planned 10b5‑1 trading programs tied to RSU vesting cadence suggest periodic supply as shares vest; plans were subsequently terminated (May 2024, Feb 2025, Jun 2025), indicating active management of liquidity windows .
Employment Terms
| Term | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Offer/acceptance dates | Offer letter dated Jul 15, 2022; acceptance signed Jul 18, 2022 | |
| Role/tenure | CAO since July 2022 | |
| At‑will & arbitration | Employment at‑will; binding arbitration; company pays all but first $125 of arbitration fees | |
| Confidentiality/IP | Confidential information and invention assignment obligations | |
| Insider trading policy | Insider Trading Policy referenced in annual reports | |
| Clawback policy | Compensation Recovery Policy (Exhibit 97.1) | |
| Non‑compete/Non‑solicit | Not specifically disclosed in Rawlings’ offer letter beyond restrictions on conflicting employment/activities |
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Emphasis on equity vs. cash: Initial RSU grant of $3,000,000 alongside a $500,000 salary indicates high equity leverage for alignment; ongoing refresh eligibility reinforces equity‑heavy mix .
- Program safeguards: No hedging/pledging, double‑trigger CIC arrangements, robust ownership requirements, and clawback policy support shareholder‑friendly governance .
- Visibility gaps: No disclosure of Rawlings’ bonus targets, actual payouts, or personal PSU grants/targets limits granular pay‑for‑performance assessment (company‑level PSU design is disclosed) .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- 2024 Say‑on‑Pay approval: 98% favorable vote; LDCC continues to consider shareholder views in compensation decisions .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Large initial RSU grant and refresh structure, coupled with ownership requirements and clawbacks, align Rawlings with long‑term value creation and governance best practices .
- Selling pressure: Successive 10b5‑1 plans oriented around RSU vesting imply episodic stock supply; terminations in 2024–2025 suggest dynamic management of sales timing, potentially moderating pressure depending on future plan activity .
- Retention/transition risk: Company uses double‑trigger CIC arrangements broadly for executives (specific terms disclosed for certain officers), which typically reduce retention risk around transactions; Rawlings’ offer letter is at‑will without disclosed severance specifics, leaving individual separation economics unquantified .
- Data limitations: Absence of Rawlings‑specific ownership totals, option holdings, bonus metrics, and PSU targets/actuals constrains precise pay‑for‑performance calibration; monitoring future proxies and Form 4s is warranted .