Evan Lippman
About Evan Lippman
Evan Lippman is Executive Vice President, Business Development at Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, appointed March 31, 2025; age 56. He previously led corporate development and strategy at multiple biopharma companies and holds an MBA from Cornell University, a BA in Business Administration and Finance from Georgia State University, and an additional BA from Bucknell University . Company performance context: Teva reported 2024 Net Revenue of $16,544 million and Net Income of $(1,959) million; a $100 investment in Teva at 12/31/2019 was valued at $224.90 at 12/31/2024 versus $135.41 for the Dow Jones U.S. Select Pharmaceuticals Index . Teva’s executive pay is tied to Net Revenues, Non-GAAP EPS, and Free Cash Flow; long-term PSUs emphasize cumulative Free Cash Flow and Net Revenue Growth with an absolute stock price modifier .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pfizer | Executive Director, Worldwide BD & Strategic Planning; Senior Director, Head of International BD; Senior Director, Pharmaceutical Finance Licensing & Acquisitions | 2002–2006 | Global BD, licensing, and strategic planning leadership |
| AstraZeneca | Executive Director & GM, Crestor (CV); Nexium/Primary Care BU (GI & CV); Certriad Launch Product; Head of U.S. BD | 2006–2012 | U.S. BD leadership and P&L/GM roles across major brands and launches |
| EMD Serono | SVP & GM, US Neurology & Immunology, Global Marketing | 2012–2014 | Business unit general management and global marketing in neuro/immunology |
| Aileron Therapeutics | Chief Business & Financial Officer | 2015–2016 | Corporate finance and BD at a clinical oncology company |
| Takeda | SVP, Head of Corporate Development, M&A, and BD Finance | 2017–2021 | Led M&A and corporate development, integrating BD with finance |
| Intima Biosciences | President & Chief Operating Officer | 2021–2022 | Operating leadership at a biotechnology company |
| Alnylam Pharmaceuticals | Chief Corporate Development & Strategy Officer | 2022–2025 | Corporate development and strategic planning at a leading RNAi company |
| Teva Pharmaceutical Industries | EVP, Business Development | 2025–present | Corporate development leadership aligned to Teva’s Pivot to Growth |
External Roles
No external public-company directorships or board committee roles are disclosed for Lippman in Teva’s 2025 proxy .
Fixed Compensation
- Executive cash incentive design and caps:
- Target annual cash incentive capped at 100% of base salary for executive officers (150% for CEO); maximum payout capped at 200% of target (133% for CEO) .
- Annual equity award maxima:
- 2024 program: $11.0 million at target for CEO and $4.5 million at target for other executive officers .
- Amended 2025 Compensation Policy: increases maxima to $16 million (CEO) and $6 million (other executive officers); maximum value defined as greater of grant-date fair value or target value .
- Pay mix ranges (amended 2025 policy): base salary 5–30%; annual cash bonus 5–30%; annual equity 40–90% (greater emphasis on equity) .
- Ownership guidelines: CEO 6x base; other executive officers 3x base; directors 5x annual cash fee; achievement expected within five years for executives .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive Structure and 2024 Actuals
| Category | Weighting | Metric | Threshold | Target | Maximum | Actual | % Achievement |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Company Financial | 75% | Net Revenues | $13.6B | $16.0B | $19.2B | $16.8B | 105% |
| Company Financial | 75% | Non-GAAP EPS | $2.02 | $2.38 | $2.86 | $2.49 | 105% |
| Company Financial | 75% | Free Cash Flow | $1.6B | $1.9B | $2.3B | $2.1B | 109% |
| Individual | 25% | Role-specific objectives | — | — | — | Assessed via rating | Included in payout curve |
- Payout curve: Below 85% weighted average for Company metrics → 0%; Target 100% → 100% payout; Maximum 120% → up to 200% for executives (133% CEO); linear interpolation; individual performance minimum 90% for threshold .
Long-Term Incentives (PSUs/RSUs)
| Vehicle | Proportion | Vesting | Performance Metrics (Weighting) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 67% for executive officers (70% CEO) | Three-year cliff | 2024–2026 Cumulative Free Cash Flow (60%), Net Revenue Growth (annual and cumulative) (40%), Absolute Stock Price modifier (caps at target if stock price declines; can increase up to 150% subject to cap) | Metrics and modifier align pay with growth, profitability, and shareholder value |
| RSUs | 33% for executive officers (30% CEO) | 25% per year over four years | N/A | Time-based retention and ownership culture |
- PSU measurement and earning percentages: Net Revenue Growth uses four point-to-point assessments (each 25% weight); earning percentage: below threshold 0%, threshold 25%, target 100%, maximum 200% (linear interpolation) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: executives must hold 3x base salary; unvested time-based RSUs count; unvested PSUs and all options are excluded (vested options removed from counting in 2024 update). All NEOs were compliant or within the attainment period at last measurement .
- Anti-hedging/anti-pledging: executives and directors are prohibited from hedging (options, swaps, short sales) and from pledging Teva securities as collateral; policy extends one year post-termination .
- Insider trading controls: pre-clearance, regular blackout schedules, and prohibitions on speculative transactions; policy updated November 2024 .
Employment Terms
- Executive Compensation Policy (amended 2025) – key termination economics:
- Advance notice of termination: up to nine months with continued compensation and duties unless determined otherwise .
- Severance: up to 1x annual base salary + target annual bonus; CEO up to 1.5x salary + target bonus, upon qualifying termination; amounts can reflect pre-2025 terms where applicable .
- Change in control (double trigger within two years): additional cash award up to 1x annual base salary + target bonus, or pre-2025 amounts; may be granted in addition to other arrangements, including equity benefits .
- Benefits continuation: medical and life insurance for up to 18 months post-termination .
- Equity: acceleration/continued vesting and extended option exercise windows may apply post-termination per plan and agreements .
- Clawback: SEC/NYSE-compliant restatement clawback plus broader misconduct-based recoupment under Company policy (including cancellation/offset of equity) .
- Non-compete/nonsolicit: policy includes restrictive covenants; non-compete periods vary by agreement and policy framework .
Performance & Track Record Indicators
- Company pay-versus-performance context (PEO and NEO averages) shows linkage to Net Revenue, Net Income, and TSR; most important measures in 2024 were Net Revenue, Free Cash Flow, Non-GAAP EPS, and Stock Price . Lippman’s role is designed to drive BD-led growth aligned to these metrics .
Company Performance Reference (context for Lippman’s 2025–forward remit)
| Metric | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |---|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:| | Net Revenue ($mm) | 16,659 | 15,878 | 14,925 | 15,846 | 16,544 | | Net Income ($mm) | (4,099) | 456 | (2,499) | (615) | (1,959) | | Teva TSR – Value of $100 | 98.47 | 81.73 | 93.06 | 106.53 | 224.90 | | Peer Group TSR – Value of $100 | 114.32 | 129.31 | 123.43 | 124.97 | 135.41 |
Compensation Structure Analysis (Signals)
- Increased equity emphasis and higher maxima under the 2025 policy point to stronger long-term, equity-linked incentives and flexibility for talent retention; pay mix shifts toward equity (40–90%) reduce guaranteed cash and increase at-risk pay .
- Annual cash incentive metrics weight top-line (Net Revenues), profitability (Non-GAAP EPS), and cash generation (Free Cash Flow), with high thresholds (85%) to avoid windfall payouts and promote disciplined execution .
- Anti-hedging and anti-pledging policies, ownership guidelines, and expanded clawback reduce misalignment and risk of opportunistic trading or leverage against shares .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: Lippman’s BD mandate complements Teva’s compensation architecture that prioritizes Net Revenue Growth and Free Cash Flow, reinforced by PSUs and strict anti-pledging/hedging—positive for pay-for-performance and shareholder alignment .
- Retention risk: Policy-based severance (up to 1x salary+bonus; double-trigger CoC up to 1x additional) and four-year RSU vesting create retention hooks; expanded equity maxima increase competitiveness in acquiring and retaining BD talent .
- Trading/pressure signals: Anti-pledging and blackout/pre-clearance reduce near-term selling pressure from executives; watch future Form 4 filings for initial ownership build and any sales post-vesting to gauge personal alignment and liquidity needs .
- Execution risk: BD-driven growth requires disciplined capital allocation; PSU metrics tied to cumulative Free Cash Flow and Net Revenue Growth should constrain value-destructive deals and reward accretive execution, with stock price modifier further tying payouts to shareholder value .