Trevor Stedke
About Trevor Stedke
Trevor J. Stedke is Senior Vice President, Operations at Frontier Group Holdings (Frontier Airlines), serving in this role since April 2019; he was 54 years old as of April 3, 2025 and 53 as of April 12, 2024 . He holds a B.S. in Aviation Engineering/Atmospheric Science from The Ohio State University and an M.S. in Engineering Management from Christian Brothers University, with a 30-year operations background across Southwest Airlines, FedEx Air Operations, Southern Air Transport, and a stint as an aircraft operations industry expert at Boston Consulting Group . Company performance during his recent tenure: revenues increased from $3,248 million (FY22) to $3,683 million (FY24), while EBITDA remained negative at $(204) million in FY24; values retrieved from S&P Global.*
| Metric | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($USD Millions) | 3,248* | 3,509* | 3,683* |
| EBITDA ($USD Millions) | (77)* | (98)* | (204)* |
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frontier Airlines (ULCC) | SVP, Operations | Apr 2019–Present | Leads airline operations; accountable for operational KPIs used in corporate bonus funding (e.g., aircraft availability, turn performance, on-time head-start, bag mishandling rank) . |
| Boston Consulting Group | Aircraft Operations Industry Expert (A&D) | Sep 2018–Apr 2019 | Advised on aircraft technical ops; operations best practices . |
| Southwest Airlines | VP, Aircraft Technical Operations | Jun 2012–Sep 2018 | Led technical ops for large U.S. carrier; reliability and maintenance leadership . |
| FedEx Air Operations | Managing Director, Aircraft Engineering, Planning & Performance | Dec 2006–Jun 2012 | Directed engineering, planning, performance; fleet reliability/cost optimization . |
| FedEx Air Operations | Various leadership & senior roles | Dec 1997–Dec 2006 | Progressive operations management . |
| Southern Air Transport | Director, Aircraft Technical Operations | Jan 1995–Dec 1997 | Ran technical ops; early-career leadership . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Shift5 | Special Advisor, Commercial Aviation Division | Since Feb 2024 | Advisory role in avionics/data security; outside affiliation . |
| Embry‑Riddle Aeronautical University | Engineering Advisory Board Member | Jun 2014–Mar 2024 | Academic advisory capacity . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year | Base Salary ($) | Discretionary/Other Bonus ($) | Non‑Equity Incentive (Annual Performance Bonus) ($) | All Other Compensation ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | 379,209 | 258,924 (retention/IPO/special) | 189,794 | 9,900 | 2,037,832 |
| 2022 | 371,426 | 428,100 | 227,003 | 9,150 | 1,585,679 |
Discrete 2023 non-recurring awards:
- IPO bonus: $180,000 .
- Special cash bonus (post-CARES Act restrictions): $45,931 .
- Merger retention program (Spirit/Top Gun): $461,093 total approved; remaining portion paid April 4, 2023 after CARES Act restrictions expired; 50% forfeited upon merger termination .
Performance Compensation
Plan design and targets:
- Target bonus opportunity: 65% of base salary for Stedke in FY2023; annual bonuses weighted 75% corporate performance and 25% individual performance .
- Stedke FY2023 bonus target dollars: $246,486; payout based on 77% corporate attainment plus individual assessment; annual bonus paid: $189,794 .
| Component/Metric | Weighting | Target | Actual | Payout Basis | Vesting |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Corporate component (FY2023) | 75% | Mix of financial + operational goals | Corporate attainment 77% | Applied to 75% of bonus target | Cash (paid early 2024) |
| Individual performance (FY2023) | 25% | Not pre‑set; Committee discretion | Committee review of contributions | Applied to 25% of bonus target | Cash (paid early 2024) |
| Operational Objective: Aircraft Availability at Start of Day | Included in corporate | ≥92% | 93% | “Target Achieved” | N/A |
| Operational Objective: Controllable Turn Performance | Included in corporate | ≥75% | 79% | “Target Achieved” | N/A |
| Operational Objective: Head Start On‑Time Percentage | Included in corporate | ≥75% | 74% | “Target Not Achieved” | N/A |
| Operational Objective: DOT Mishandled Bag Rate (Industry Rank) | Included in corporate | ≤4 (rank) | 5 | “Target Not Achieved” | N/A |
2024 context (for plan structure only): FY2024 corporate attainment 79% and same 75%/25% weighting; Stedke was not an NEO in 2024; included here to show ongoing framework .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Total beneficial ownership | 133,985 shares as of March 28, 2024; “<1%” of outstanding shares . |
| Vested vs unvested (12/31/2023) | Unvested RSUs: 13,237 (2/23/2021), 29,170 (2/3/2022), 36,765 (2/8/2023), 182,292 (10/25/2023); market values disclosed . |
| Options | No options disclosed for Stedke; no option exercises in 2023 . |
| Stock vested (2023) | 67,612 RSUs vested; value realized $754,858 . |
| Hedging/Pledging | Company prohibits hedging transactions by covered persons; no pledging policy disclosed in proxies . |
| Ownership guidelines | Director stock ownership guidelines disclosed; no executive ownership guideline disclosure found . |
Grant history and vesting:
- RSU grants: 36,765 (Feb 8, 2023; grants vest 1/3 annually on Feb 8, 2024–2026) and 182,292 (Oct 25, 2023; vest 1/3 annually Oct 25, 2024–2026); grant date fair values $500,004 and $700,001 respectively .
- Outstanding at 12/31/2023 reflected above .
Insider trading signals:
- Late Form 4 filings on Feb 7, 2024 (including Stedke) reported RSU vesting and tax withholding only; suggests administrative timing rather than discretionary selling pressure .
Employment Terms
| Term | Provision |
|---|---|
| Offer letter/date | Offer letter February 13, 2019 for SVP, Operations; employment terminable at will . |
| Base/bonus eligibility | Base salary plus target bonus under Management Bonus Plan; eligible for executive benefit plans (including flight benefits under UATP) . |
| Restrictive covenants | Confidentiality; non‑compete and non‑solicitation during employment and 12 months thereafter (24 months if terminated without Cause or duties substantially diminished and he resigns within 12 months after a Change in Control) . |
| Severance (no CIC) | Lump sum of 1× (base salary + target bonus) and 1 year of UATP flight benefits; general release required . |
| Severance (CIC window) | If terminated without Cause or resigns due to diminished duties within 12 months after a Change in Control: 2× (base + target bonus), 2 years UATP flight benefits, and full acceleration of initial RSU vesting; general release required . |
| Definitions | “Cause” and “Change in Control” governed by Company equity plan . |
| Company‑wide CIC policy (Feb 3, 2022) | On qualifying CIC (≥40% voting power change) and termination without cause/for good reason: outstanding equity fully vests for executive officers; CIC definition for severance deemed to include ≥40% voting power change . |
| Clawback policy | Adopted Oct 2, 2023 effective date; recovery of erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon accounting restatements; administered by Compensation Committee . |
Investment Implications
- Pay‑for‑performance mechanics tie a significant portion of cash comp to corporate operational/financial goals (75% corporate, 25% individual), with Stedke’s target bonus at 65% of salary in 2023; actual payout reflected the 77% corporate attainment, implying reasonable performance linkage .
- Equity alignment is moderate: Stedke’s beneficial ownership is <1% and equity grants are time‑vested RSUs (no disclosed PSUs), which reduce performance risk but may increase guaranteed compensation profile; scheduled vesting events historically involved tax withholding rather than discretionary sales .
- Retention risk appears contained by robust double‑trigger CIC severance (2× cash plus flight benefits and equity acceleration) and non‑compete/non‑solicit covenants (up to 24 months post‑CIC termination), although equity is primarily time‑based and thus less performance‑contingent .
- Company fundamentals during his tenure show revenue growth but negative EBITDA, which may temper the incentive pool and highlight execution focus on cost and operational KPIs that drive bonus funding (e.g., aircraft availability, turn performance, on‑time head‑start, bag mishandling rank); values retrieved from S&P Global.* .
*Values retrieved from S&P Global.