Matthew Aboud
CENTURY ALUMINUMAbout Matthew Aboud
Matthew Aboud, 49, is Senior Vice President, Strategy & Business Development at Century Aluminum (CENX), a role he has held since May 2021 after 17 years at Hydro Aluminum, where he most recently served as Vice President – Extrusion Ingot & Wire Rod overseeing primary and secondary casthouses across Europe . In 2024, Century produced 690,000 tonnes of aluminum, generated $337 million in net income and $244 million in adjusted EBITDA, and executed key strategic initiatives (Jamalco integration, Grundartangi billet casthouse, DOE-selected U.S. smelter project), with corporate AIP financial/operational/safety metrics achieved at 106% of target and 2022–2024 PSUs vesting at 145.6% on strong relative TSR . The company’s 2024 pay-versus-performance disclosure shows relative TSR of 167.2% and links PSU payouts primarily to relative TSR against an aluminum peer set, reinforcing a pay-for-performance model senior leaders like Aboud participate in .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hydro Aluminum | Vice President – Extrusion Ingot & Wire Rod; earlier roles across 17 years | Through 2021 (17 years prior to joining CENX in May 2021) | Oversaw primary and secondary casthouse facilities throughout Europe; deep operations/commercial experience in aluminum value chain |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year summary (NEO disclosures)
| Year | Salary ($) | Stock Awards ($) | Non-Equity Incentive (AIP) ($) | All Other Comp ($) | Total ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 359,969 | 421,962 | 216,500 | 31,050 | 1,029,481 |
| 2023 | 340,154 | 298,979 | 187,902 | 29,700 | 906,735 |
| 2022 | 327,692 | 278,191 | 179,850 | 27,450 | 813,183 |
2024 structure
- Base salary: $365,000 annualized (+6.4% vs. 2023)
- Target bonus: 50% of base salary (AIP)
- Actual bonus paid (AIP): $216,500 (Final AIP Performance Factor 119%)
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive Plan (AIP) – 2024
| Component | Weighting | Target | Actual/Payout | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Financial/Operational/Safety (FOS) metrics | 70% | Pre-set ranges | 106% of target | Reflects company-wide execution; specifics not fully disclosed due to competitive sensitivity |
| Individual performance criteria | 30% | Pre-set, role-specific | Part of final factor; overall Final AIP Factor for Aboud = 119% | Individual ranges for NEOs spanned 33%–170%; Committee applied discretion within policy |
| Resulting AIP award | — | $182,500 target (50% of salary) | $216,500 | From Final AIP Factor × target |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP) – 2024–2026 design and Aboud grants
| Instrument | Weight | Metric/Formula | Performance Period | Vesting | 2024 Grant (Aboud) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% (Aboud) | Relative TSR vs Industry Peer Group; 50% measured over 2024–2025, 50% over 2024–2026; Achievement: 0% at 50% of peer avg; 100% at 100%; 200% at 150% | 2024–2025; 2024–2026 | Cliff-vest at period end, subject to performance; Committee may apply ±30-pt Strategic Objective Modifier | 17,379 target PSUs granted 1/1/2024 |
| TVSUs | 50% (Aboud) | Time-based | 3 years from grant | Cliff-vest 1/1/2027 if employed (3 years from 1/1/2024 grant) | 17,379 TVSUs granted 1/1/2024 |
LTIP outcomes (most recent completed cycle)
| Cycle | Metric | Target vs Earned | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022–2024 PSUs | Relative TSR vs aluminum peers | Aboud: 11,205 target; 16,314 earned (145.6% payout) | Committee did not apply strategic modifier; payout driven by 95.6% of peer TSR over 2022–2023 (91.2% payout) and 163.8% over 2022–2024 (200% payout) |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership | 30,027 shares (<1% per company table). Approx. 0.03% of 93,296,937 shares outstanding as of 4/21/2025 (calculation using 30,027/93,296,937). Sources: ownership table and shares outstanding |
| Unvested time-vested units | 2023–2025 TVSUs: 18,275 ($332,971 at $18.22); 2024–2026 TVSUs: 17,379 ($316,645) |
| Unvested performance units (at target) | 2023–2025 PSUs: 18,275 ($332,971); 2024–2026 PSUs: 17,379 ($316,645); actual payout 0–200% based on relative TSR |
| 2024 vesting activity | Shares acquired on vesting: 21,908; value realized $399,164 (2022–2024 TVSUs/PSUs; not an open-market sale) |
| Options | None disclosed; no stock options/SARs granted in 2024 |
| Pledging/hedging | Prohibited (no short sales, hedging, margin or pledging) |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Senior Vice Presidents: 18,000 shares; each current NEO is in compliance or within grace period |
Implication: Aboud exceeds the SVP guideline (30,027 vs 18,000), with significant unvested equity that vests through end-2025 and early 2027—supporting alignment and retention .
Employment Terms
- Status: At-will; no individual employment agreement for NEOs .
- Clawback: SEC/Nasdaq-compliant restatement recovery; additional misconduct-based recoupment at Board/Comp Committee discretion .
- Non-compete/forfeiture: Awards may be reduced/cancelled/recouped for violations (e.g., noncompetition/nonsolicitation/confidentiality) per plan terms .
Severance and change-in-control economics (Executive Severance Plan)
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Tier | Cash Multiple | Equity Treatment | Insurance | Illustrative Total for Aboud |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary termination without cause (outside CIC/acquisition windows) | Tier 3 | 0.5× salary + pro-rata AIP | Unvested awards forfeited; pro-rata in limited “retirement/disability/death” cases | $16,311 | $415,311 (Salary $182,500; Bonus $216,500; TVSUs $327,529; PSUs $327,529; Insurance $16,311; totals reflect category rules) |
| Termination in connection with a qualifying acquisition | Tier 3 | 0.5× salary + 0.5× target AIP + pro‑rata AIP | Pro‑rata at target | $16,311 | $1,178,619 (Salary $182,500; Bonus $324,750; TVSUs $327,529; PSUs $327,529; Insurance $16,311) |
| Double-trigger termination during CIC Protection Period | Tier 3 | 1.0× (salary + target AIP) + pro‑rata AIP | All LTIP paid at target; full acceleration of unvested awards | $32,622 | $1,879,354 (Salary $365,000; Bonus $182,500; TVSUs $649,616; PSUs $649,616; Insurance $32,622) |
Notes: “Double trigger” applies—no acceleration absent termination; definitions and protection windows per plan .
Performance Compensation Details (Design Mechanics)
| Element | Metric/Weighting | Payout Curve | Governance |
|---|---|---|---|
| AIP | 70% Financial/Operational/Safety; 30% Individual | 0–200% per metric; FOS 106% in 2024; Aboud final factor 119% | Committee discretion within disclosed policy; targets set annually; some details withheld due to competitive sensitivity |
| PSUs | Relative TSR vs aluminum Industry Peer Group (Alcoa, Hydro, Chalco, Rusal) | 0% at 50% of peer avg; 100% at 100%; 200% at 150%; 50% payout tested after 2 years, 50% after 3 years | Strategic Objective Modifier up to ±30 pts; Committee can adjust within policy; double-trigger CIC |
Investment Implications
- Alignment and retention: High equity mix (TVSUs/PSUs), prohibition on pledging/hedging, and ownership guideline compliance indicate strong “skin in the game.” Significant unvested awards through end-2025 and early 2027 likely reduce near-term attrition risk .
- Pay-for-performance signal: PSU design tied to relative TSR produced a 145.6% payout for 2022–2024; combined with 106% FOS performance and Aboud’s 119% AIP factor, incentives are sensitive to operational execution and market-relative value creation .
- Potential selling pressure from vesting: 2023–2025 PSUs/TVSUs (target 36,550 units combined) vest end-2025 subject to performance; 2024–2026 TVSUs vest 1/1/2027 and PSUs at 12/31/2026, adding potential supply, though sales decisions depend on individual diversification and policy constraints (no pledging/hedging) .
- Downside protection and discipline: Double-trigger CIC mechanics and a robust clawback reduce windfall risk and protect shareholders in adverse events .
2024 company context: Net income $337m and adjusted EBITDA $244m alongside strategic project execution underpin incentive outcomes and support confidence in management’s long-term plan that executives, including Aboud, are paid to deliver .
Citations:
Executive officer bio (role, age, prior Hydro roles).
2024 production, net income, adjusted EBITDA.
Strategic highlights (Jamalco integration, Grundartangi, DOE grant).
CD&A alignment and outcomes.
PSU payout 145.6% and Aboud earned shares.
AIP design and FOS performance 106%.
Final AIP factor and payouts.
Salary and AIP target percent, 2024 salary adjustment.
2024 grant counts for PSUs/TVSUs.
PSU design and payout curve; TVSU vesting.
Outstanding equity awards at FY-end (counts/values).
2024 vesting value/amounts.
No options granted in 2024.
Hedging/pledging prohibition; clawback policy.
Severance/CIC structure summary; ownership guidelines.
Severance and CIC multiples; tiering.
Aboud’s potential payments table.
Double-trigger CIC vesting terms.
Pay vs performance and relative TSR data.
Shares outstanding; equity plan metrics for dilution context.
Beneficial ownership for Aboud.