Peter Trpkovski
CENTURY ALUMINUMAbout Peter Trpkovski
Century Aluminum’s Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer (Principal Financial Officer) since March 21, 2025; age 43; joined Century in 2013; BSE (Electrical & Computer Engineering) and MBA (Finance) from the University of Michigan . He signed Section 302/906 certifications for CENX’s Q2 and Q3 2025 filings, underscoring control and reporting accountability . Company performance frameworks tied to his incentive plans emphasize operational execution and shareholder alignment: 2024 Annual Incentive Plan financial/operational/safety metrics paid at 106% of target, and 2022–2024 PSUs vested at 145.6% of target on superior relative TSR versus peers .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Century Aluminum | EVP & CFO; Treasurer | 2025–present | Promote strategic initiatives, strengthen financial operations; continuity following planned transition . |
| Century Aluminum | SVP, Finance & Treasurer | 2023–2025 | Led treasury, finance; previously led FP&A and Risk Management . |
| Century Aluminum | VP, Finance & Investor Relations | 2022–2023 | Investor-facing finance leadership; capital markets communications . |
| Century Aluminum | Director, Financial Planning & Analysis | 2019–2022 | Enterprise planning and performance analytics . |
| Citigroup | Senior Financial Analyst | 2011–2013 | Sell-side/banking analytical experience (finance) . |
| Johnson Controls | Engineering and Finance roles | Six years (dates not specified) | Cross-functional operations/finance grounding . |
External Roles
No external public company board roles disclosed in company filings reviewed for 2025 (executive officer background and appointment materials) .
Fixed Compensation
| Component | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $450,000 initial annual base salary effective upon promotion to CFO (Mar 21, 2025) | |
| Employment Status | At-will; the Company does not have employment agreements with NEOs |
Performance Compensation
Annual Incentive (AIP)
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Target Bonus | 65% of base salary (2025 AIP target) | |
| Design | 70% Financial/Operational/Safety metrics; 30% Individual performance | |
| 2024 FOS Result (Company) | 106% of target (basis for AIP funding framework) | |
| 2024 Individual Performance (Company ranges) | CEO 180%; average other NEOs 113% | |
| Example 2024 AIP Payouts (Company) | Final AIP factors drove payouts per table (e.g., CEO $1,279,852 on 122% final factor) |
Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP)
| Award Type | Weighting (EVP/Other NEOs) | Performance Metric / Vesting | Target Opportunity | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs | 50% of LTIP value for non-CEO NEOs | Relative TSR vs Industry Peer Group; two tranches: 2-year (2024–2025) and 3-year (2024–2026); payout 0%–200% with Strategic Objective Modifier up to ±30 pts; cliff vest at end of period if employed | CFO eligible; part of 160% of salary LTIP target | |
| TVSUs | 50% of LTIP value for non-CEO NEOs | Time-vested units; 3-year cliff (example for 2024–2026 design) | CFO eligible; part of 160% of salary LTIP target | |
| CFO 2025–2027 LTIP Target | 160% of base salary; 50/50 mix PSUs and TVSUs for 2025–2027 performance period | Award structure per promotion terms | 160% of $450,000 |
PSU Payout Schedule (Illustrative from 2024–2026 design):
- Threshold: Relative TSR = 50% of Industry Peer Average → 0% payout
- Target: 100% → 100% payout
- Maximum: 150% → 200% payout
- Strategic Objective Modifier: Committee discretion ±30 percentage points
Realized Results Reference:
- 2022–2024 PSUs vested at 145.6% of target based on relative TSR (95.6% of peer average over 2022–2023 = 91.2% payout; 163.8% over 2022–2024 = 200% payout; blended 145.6%) .
Options
- Company historically has not used stock options/SARs in executive program; none granted in 2024 .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Beneficial Ownership (initial filing) | Form 3 (as of 07/01/2023): 55,906 shares/units beneficially owned | |
| Breakdown (from Form 3) | 13,908 shares acquired; 3,443 unvested TVSUs vest 03/25/2024; 1,585 unvested TVSUs vest 01/01/2025; 9,130 unvested TVSUs vest 01/01/2026; 27,840 TVSUs granted 02/09/2023 vest in 3 equal annual installments on each anniversary | |
| Ownership Concentration | Company disclosed no individual director/executive officer beneficially owned ≥1% as of 04/21/2025; all directors/executive officers as a group: 712,128 shares | |
| Stock Ownership Guidelines | Executive Vice Presidents: 48,000 shares; compliance window 5 years from promotion | |
| Pledging/Hedging | Company policy prohibits pledging, hedging, short sales, and holding in margin accounts |
Employment Terms
| Provision | Detail | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | No individual employment agreement; at-will | |
| Severance Plan Tier | Executive Severance Plan; Tier 2 participant | |
| Acquisition Protection Period (6 months pre / 24 months post acquisition) | Termination without cause or for good reason → 1.0x base salary + 1.0x target annual incentive; plus pro-rata target annual incentive; pro-rata portion of outstanding LTIP at target | |
| Change in Control Protection Period (6 months pre / 24 months post CIC) | Double trigger: termination without cause or for good reason → 1.5x (Tier 2) of (base salary + target annual incentive); plus pro-rata target annual incentive; all outstanding LTIP paid at target | |
| Equity Plan CIC Vesting | Double-trigger vesting; if awards not replaced, vest at target on CIC; otherwise accelerate upon qualifying termination during protection window | |
| Clawback Policy | Incentive Compensation Recoupment Policy compliant with SEC/Nasdaq listing standards; applies to incentive-based compensation over 3 years preceding a restatement; extends to fraud/misconduct | |
| Plan-Level Clawback/Forfeiture | Awards subject to clawback/recoupment and may be reduced/cancelled for cause, violations, or misconduct |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High at-risk mix (AIP + LTIP), PSU payouts driven by relative TSR vs. aluminum peers, and double-trigger CIC structures limit windfalls; 2022–2024 PSU payout at 145.6% validates linkage to shareholder returns .
- Retention and supply overhang: 2023 TVSU grants with scheduled vesting (annual installments and cliff dates) create predictable vesting events that can contribute to episodic insider selling pressure as units settle; prohibitions on pledging/hedging and stock ownership guidelines (48,000 shares for EVPs within five years) support alignment but require continued accumulation post-promotion (Mar 21, 2025) .
- Downside and governance protections: No options granted in 2024 (reduces repricing/option-overhang risk), robust clawback framework, and at-will employment reduce structural governance risk; severance is competitive but not excessive for Tier 2 (1.0x Aquisition Protection; 1.5x CIC) .
- Execution track record: Management credited 2024 achievements (DOE funding negotiations for up to $500M, new Grundartangi casthouse commissioning, Jamalco integration/long-term alumina supply) that fed incentive outcomes; as newly appointed CFO, Trpkovski’s long internal tenure (FP&A, IR, Treasury) suggests continuity on capital allocation and risk management .