
Rob Krcmarov
About Rob Krcmarov
President and CEO of Hecla Mining Company (NYSE: HL) since November 7, 2024; age 60; Director since 2024. A career geologist and international mining executive with 35+ years’ experience, including 13 years on Barrick Gold’s executive leadership team and service across >20 countries; current public board: Orla Mining Ltd. . Under his tenure as CEO (2025 YTD), Hecla delivered record quarterly revenue ($410M), net income ($101M), and Adjusted EBITDA ($196M) in Q3’25, with net leverage reduced to 0.3x and cash at $134M; Q2’25 set records for sales ($304M), FCF ($103.8M), and Adj. EBITDA ($132.5M); Q1’25 achieved record Adj. EBITDA ($90.8M) and improved net leverage to 1.5x . 2024 company context (partial pre-tenure): sales $929.9M, operating cash flow $218.3M, net leverage improved from 2.7x to 1.6x; 2022-2024 LTIP paid 84% and 2022 PSUs paid $0 due to sub-50th percentile TSR .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Barrick Gold Corporation | Executive Vice President – Exploration & Growth (member of executive leadership team) | Mar 2016 – Nov 2021 | Led exploration and growth; senior executive responsibility across regions; deep operating, R&D, and strategic planning experience . |
| Barrick Gold Corporation | Various leadership roles (mine site, regional, corporate) | 2001 – 2016 | Drove exploration and mining operations across >20 countries; stakeholder and capital markets engagement . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes / potential interlocks |
|---|---|---|---|
| Orla Mining Ltd. | Director | Nov 2023 – present | Current public directorship; industry adjacency . |
| Coeur Mining | Director | Dec 2023 – Sep 2024 | Ended prior to CEO appointment; competitor exposure mitigated by departure . |
| Osisko Gold Royalties | Director | Oct 2022 – Oct 2024 | Ended 2024; royalty/streaming adjacency . |
| Major Drilling Group International | Director | Sep 2022 – Oct 2024 | Ended 2024; services adjacency . |
Fixed Compensation
| Year/Term | Base salary ($) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 2025 (offer terms) | 850,000 | Initial CEO base salary per offer letter; eligible for STIP (target 110% of salary); relocation and certain tax filings assistance (provided in 2025) . |
| 2024 (actual paid) | 93,500 | Partial-year CEO (start 11/7/24) . |
| 2024 All Other Compensation ($) | 462 | As reported . |
Performance Compensation
STIP structure, targets, and 2024 outcomes
- Target opportunity: CEO 110% of base salary; range 0–200% of target; 2024 was prorated for Krcmarov (joined 11/7/24) .
- 2024 corporate factor weights: Safety 10%, Environmental 10%, Operations 25%, Financial 45%, Exploration 10% .
- 2024 results: Calculated corporate performance 92%, with a -7% discretionary reduction to 85% payout; CEO STIP paid $132,458 (prorated) .
| Metric (2024 STIP) | Weight | Targeting details / result | Performance value |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safety – AIFR reduction | 5% | Threshold 1.37, Target 1.22, Max 0.87; actual 1.86 (below threshold) | 0% . |
| Safety – Leading indicators | 5% | Threshold 100%, Target 110%, Max 120%; actual 107% | 2% . |
| Environmental | 10% | 10% reduction in reportable exceedances at 3/4 mines achieved | 15% aggregate environmental factor contribution noted in roll-up . |
| Operations – AgEq | 25% | Production shortfalls impacted results | 0% . |
| Financial – Operating Cash Flow | 15% of 45% | Above target | 28% (aggregate within financial) . |
| Financial – AISC/Ag oz. | 15% of 45% | By-product credits lowered AISC | 29% (aggregate within financial) . |
| Financial – Capital Spending | 15% of 45% | Discipline vs plan | 12% (aggregate within financial) . |
| Exploration – Reserves | 5% of 10% | Reserves maintained near historic highs | 6% (aggregate within exploration) . |
| Exploration – Resources | 5% of 10% | Not achieved | 0% . |
| Corporate total (pre-discretion) | — | — | 92% . |
| Committee override | — | Negative discretion | -7% . |
| Final payout as % of target | — | — | 85% . |
| CEO payout ($) | — | Prorated | 132,458 . |
LTI structure (RSUs/PSUs), vesting, and recent awards
- Equity cadence and instruments: Company typically uses RSUs (time-based, 3-year vest) and PSUs (3-year performance, includes relative TSR); generally no stock options are issued to NEOs .
- CEO new-hire awards: RSUs $1,930,000 granted January 2025, vesting over three years; PSUs $1,265,000 target to be granted June 2025 (2025 PSU program) .
- 2022 PSU outcome: PSU payout for 2022 grant was $0 per unit because three-year TSR ranking was below the 50th percentile of the peer group (disciplining pay-for-performance) .
| Award | Grant date | Grant value ($) | Vesting terms | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RSUs (CEO) | Jan 2025 | 1,930,000 | Vest over three years | Granted Jan 2025 . |
| PSUs (CEO, target) | Jun 2025 (planned) | 1,265,000 | 3-year performance period; includes relative TSR | To be granted June 2025 . |
| Stock options (CEO) | — | — | Company does not generally grant options to NEOs | Not applicable . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial ownership (3/26/2025): 6,570 shares directly; 325,016 RSUs; total 331,586 shares; less than 1% of shares outstanding .
- CEO stock ownership guideline: 6x base salary; compliance window five years from appointment; as of 12/31/2024, Krcmarov not yet required to meet guidelines (others met) .
- Hedging/pledging: Insider Trading Policy prohibits directors and officers from hedging or pledging company securities, holding in margin accounts, short-term trading, short sales, or options trading—reducing misalignment and collateral-driven selling risk .
- Deferred comp: No participation in the company’s deferred comp plan in 2024; plan frozen effective January 2025 to eliminate future deferrals .
| Ownership detail (3/26/2025) | Amount | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Direct shares | 6,570 | As of record date . |
| RSUs (unvested) | 325,016 | As of record date . |
| Total beneficial | 331,586 | <1% of class . |
Employment Terms
- Start date and role: Appointed President & CEO effective November 7, 2024; Director since 2024 .
- Offer terms: Base salary $850,000; STIP target 110% of base; relocation assistance and certain tax filing support (2025) .
- Change-in-Control (double trigger): Upon a Qualifying Termination within 3 months before or 24 months after a CIC: cash equal to 2x (base + target bonus), 24 months of COBRA premiums, $20,000 outplacement, and accelerated vesting of 100% of equity (PSUs at higher of target or actual-to-date) .
- Non‑CIC qualifying termination (illustrative as of 12/31/2024): cash equal to 1.5x (base + target bonus), 18 months COBRA, $20,000 outplacement .
- Clawback: Dodd-Frank/NYSE-compliant policy; company will reasonably promptly seek to recover erroneously awarded incentive compensation upon an accounting restatement, irrespective of misconduct findings .
| Term | Key provision |
|---|---|
| CIC severance (double trigger) | 2x (base + target bonus) cash; 24x monthly medical/dental/vision premiums; $20,000 outplacement; 100% equity acceleration (PSUs at higher of target or actual through termination) . |
| Non‑CIC severance (illustrative) | 1.5x (base + target bonus) cash; 18x monthly COBRA premiums; $20,000 outplacement . |
| Anti‑hedging/pledging | Prohibited for directors and officers . |
| Clawback | Policy applies to STIP/LTIP in restatement scenarios (last 3 completed fiscal years) . |
| Deferred comp | KEDCP frozen effective Jan 2025 (no future deferrals) . |
Performance & Track Record (Company metrics during Krcmarov’s CEO tenure and FY2024 context)
| Metric | FY 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | Q3 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue/Sales ($M) | 929.9 | 261.3 | 304.0 | 410.0 |
| Adjusted EBITDA ($M) | — | 90.8 | 132.5 | 196.0 |
| Free Cash Flow ($M) | — | — | 103.8 | 90.0 |
| Net leverage (x) | 1.6 (from 2.7) | 1.5 | 0.7 | 0.3 |
| Net income ($M) | — | — | — | 101.0 |
| Cash & equivalents ($M) | 26.9 | — | — | 134.0 |
Notes: 2024 operations met silver production and cost guidance, exceeded gold production targets; committee used negative discretion on STIP to 85% due to production shortfalls and permitting issues; 2022-2024 LTIP paid 84%, while 2022 PSUs paid $0 on relative TSR below median .
Board Governance
- Board service: Director since 2024; serves as Chair of the Executive Committee and Chair of the Non‑Executive Stock Award Committee (which grants equity to non‑Section 16 employees) .
- Independence: Board has determined all current directors other than Krcmarov are independent under NYSE rules; committee memberships (Audit/Comp/Governance) comprised of independent directors .
- Board leadership: Catherine “Cassie” J. Boggs is Board Chair; she also served as Interim CEO in 2024, mitigating CEO/Chair duality concerns for current structure .
- Dual‑role implications: CEO service on Board and as Executive Committee Chair centralizes authority; the independent Board Chair, independent key committees, and anti‑hedging/pledging/clawback policies help offset governance risk .
Compensation Structure Analysis
- Mix and leverage: CEO target total direct comp is heavily equity- and performance-based (RSUs + PSUs target $3.195M) versus base salary $850k and STIP target $935k, aligning upside with multi‑year outcomes .
- Metric rigor and discretion: 2024 STIP disclosed metric weights and outcomes; committee applied negative discretion (–7%) to 85% payout, indicating discipline; 2022 PSUs paid $0 on sub‑median TSR, reinforcing pay-for-performance .
- Instrument choice: Company generally avoids options (using RSUs/PSUs) and sets 3‑year vesting to promote retention; hedging/pledging prohibited; clawback in place—shareholder‑friendly design .
- Deferral risk: Deferred comp plan frozen in Jan 2025; reduces deferral‑related overhang and simplifies exposure .
Vesting Schedules and Insider Selling Pressure
- CEO equity cadence: 2025 RSUs vest over three years; PSUs to be granted June 2025 with a 3‑year performance period; no options outstanding—reduces near‑term exercise‑driven selling .
- Policy constraints: Anti‑hedging and anti‑pledging limit financial engineering and collateral‑driven forced sales; CEO ownership guideline (6x salary) encourages net share retention over time (compliance window 5 years from appointment) .
Equity Ownership & Alignment (Detailed)
- Total beneficial ownership: 331,586 shares (6,570 direct; 325,016 RSUs), <1% of outstanding; no options; PSUs not counted until earned .
- Ownership policy status: Not yet required to meet CEO guideline due to Nov 2024 start; others met their guidelines by 12/31/24 .
Employment Contracts, Severance, and Change‑of‑Control Economics
- CIC (double trigger): 2x (base + target bonus) cash, 24 months COBRA premiums, $20k outplacement, 100% equity acceleration (PSUs at higher of target or actual‑to‑date) .
- Non‑CIC (illustrative): 1.5x (base + target bonus), 18 months COBRA, $20k outplacement for a qualifying termination .
- Clawback: Restatement-based recoupment across the prior 3 completed fiscal years for incentive compensation .
- Non‑compete / non‑solicit / garden leave: Not disclosed in the proxy .
Performance & Track Record Highlights
- 2025 execution: Record revenue ($410M), net income ($101M), and Adj. EBITDA ($196M) in Q3’25; net leverage cut to 0.3x; cash $134M; FCF $90M; all four mines positive FCF for second straight quarter—points to operational discipline and portfolio improvement under current leadership .
- Balance sheet: Q2’25 ATM proceeds and FCF used to redeem notes and fully repay IQ notes, reducing interest expense by $17.8M annually; net leverage to 0.7x in Q2, then 0.3x in Q3 .
- 2024 baseline: Sales $929.9M; operating cash flow $218.3M; net leverage improved 2.7x→1.6x; committee applied negative discretion to STIP (85%); 2022 PSUs paid $0 on TSR below median .
Board Governance (Director Service, Committees, and Independence)
- Committees: Executive Committee (Chair); Non‑Executive Stock Award Committee (Chair) .
- Independence: All directors except Krcmarov deemed independent; Audit/Comp/Governance Committees composed of independents .
- Chair structure: Independent Board Chair (Catherine J. Boggs) .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback
- The company modified/terminated several compensation plans in response to prior Say‑on‑Pay results and shareholder engagement feedback; 2022‑2024 LTIP paid at 84%, and 2022 PSUs paid $0 on relative TSR below median .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Geologist with mine‑site, regional, and corporate leadership experience; international track record across >20 countries; strengths in operations, exploration, drilling, R&D, and strategy; stakeholder and investor engagement .
Investment Implications
- Alignment and incentives: Heavy equity mix (RSUs/PSUs) with three‑year vesting, explicit relative TSR for PSUs, anti‑hedging/pledging, robust clawback, and 6x salary ownership guideline collectively align CEO incentives with multi‑year shareholder value creation; committee’s negative discretion in 2024 and $0 PSU payout on sub‑median TSR reinforce pay‑for‑performance discipline .
- Retention vs supply overhang: Three‑year RSU vesting supports retention; absence of options reduces exercise‑driven supply; anti‑pledging limits collateral calls; however, multi‑year RSU vesting starting from 2025 could create periodic settlement-related supply near vest dates (magnitude tempered by policy and ownership requirements) .
- Governance risk: CEO chairs the Executive and Non‑Executive Stock Award Committees, concentrating some authority; mitigants include an independent Board Chair and fully independent key committees, plus stringent trading and clawback policies .
- Execution signals: 2025 record quarters, accelerating FCF, and rapid deleveraging are favorable operating signals under current leadership; watch for sustainability of Keno Hill improvements, permitting progress, and continued capital discipline as leading indicators for STIP/PSU outcomes and potential estimate revisions .