
Carol Tomé
About Carol Tomé
Carol B. Tomé is UPS’s Chief Executive Officer (since 2020) and a director (since 2003), age 68, with prior CFO and corporate finance leadership experience spanning nearly two decades at The Home Depot . She holds a B.A. in Communication from the University of Wyoming and an MBA from the University of Denver . In 2024, UPS generated $91.1 billion in revenue and returned to year-over-year revenue and profit growth beginning in Q3; the company returned $5.9 billion to shareowners through dividends and repurchases in 2024 . Pay-versus-performance disclosure shows UPS’s value of an initial fixed $100 investment at $127.43 in 2024 and non-GAAP adjusted operating profit of $8,894 million, with GAAP net income at $5,782 million .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| The Home Depot, Inc. | EVP & CFO; SVP Finance & Treasurer; VP & Treasurer | 1995–2019 | Led financial reporting, planning & analysis, investor relations, tax, strategy, IT and cybersecurity; delivered significant shareholder value and sales growth across challenging cycles |
| Johns-Manville, Inc. | Director of Banking | 1992–1995 | Corporate treasury/banking leadership supporting capital structure and liquidity management |
| United Bank of Denver (now Wells Fargo) | Commercial Lender | 1981–1992 | Corporate lending and credit; foundation in finance and risk management |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Verizon Communications, Inc. | Director | 2021–present | Large-cap telecom oversight; network and customer operations insight |
| Cisco Systems, Inc. | Director | 2019–2020 | Technology and cybersecurity oversight experience |
| Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta | Director; Board Chair | Director 2008–2013; Chair 2010–2012 | Monetary policy and regional economic oversight; macro risk perspective |
| Grady Memorial Hospital Corporation | Board Member | Not disclosed | Community health governance; stakeholder and social impact perspective |
| Atlanta Committee for Progress | Chair & Board Member | Not disclosed | Civic leadership and public-private collaboration |
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year CEO compensation (summary):
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Salary | $1,466,250 | $1,509,713 | $1,509,713 |
| Stock Awards (grant-date fair value) | $15,046,968 | $18,916,192 | $18,283,138 |
| Option Awards (grant-date fair value) | $1,228,547 | $1,358,762 | $1,358,768 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (MIP) | $1,035,932 | $1,509,713 | $2,747,677 |
| All Other Compensation | $187,504 | $95,671 | $164,681 |
| Total | $18,965,201 | $23,390,051 | $24,063,977 |
Performance Compensation
Annual Management Incentive Program (MIP) – 2024
- Design: Returned to full-year goal setting; weights revised to better align to strategic initiatives (revenue and non-GAAP adjusted operating profit weightings each increased; ROIC replaced by enterprise total committed service) .
- CEO Target: 200% of base salary; Incentive Target Value $3,019,425; Paid $2,747,677 (91% factor) .
| Metric | Target | Actual | Weighted Payout Contribution (% of Target) | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated Revenue | $93.8B | $91.1B | 41.9% | Weight increased from 20%; aligns with growth objectives |
| Consolidated non-GAAP Adjusted Operating Profit | $10.0B | $8.9B | 36.5% | Weight increased from 40%; links to operating leverage |
| Enterprise Total Committed Service | 96.1% | 96.8% | 12.4% | Replaced ROIC; service reliability metric |
| MIP Payout Factor | — | — | 91% | CEO cash payout $2,747,677 |
Long-Term Incentive Program (LTIP) – Structure and 2022 Cycle Results
- 2024 LTIP Design: 3-year performance period; metrics are non-GAAP adjusted EPS (50%) and non-GAAP adjusted free cash flow (50%); payout modified by relative TSR vs S&P 500 (±20%); maximum 220% of target .
- 2022 LTIP (performance period ended 2024): Final payout 42% after RTSR modifier; EPS metric payout 67%, FCF 56%, RTSR at 14th percentile → -20% modifier .
| 2022–2024 LTIP | EPS Metric Payout | FCF Metric Payout | Performance Payout (Avg) | RTSR Modifier | Final Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Results | 67% | 56% | 62% | -20% | 42% |
Equity Awards – 2024 Grants and Vesting
- RPUs: CEO target 115,599 RPUs; maximum 254,318; grant-date fair value $18,283,138 .
- Stock Options: 39,090 options at $154.76 strike; grant-date fair value $1,358,768; vest 20% per year over 5 years; 10-year term .
| Award Type | Grant Date | Units/Options | Strike | Vesting | Grant-Date Fair Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| LTIP RPUs (Target) | 3/20/2024 | 115,599 | — | 3-year performance (EPS, FCF; RTSR modifier) | $18,283,138 |
| Stock Options | 3/20/2024 | 39,090 | $154.76 | 20% per year over 5 years; 10-year term | $1,358,768 |
| 2024 Stock/Units Vested | 2024 | 24,930 shares | — | RSUs/RPUs vested per plan terms | $3,143,673 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Beneficial Ownership: 442,022 class A shares and 13,036 class B; total 455,058 shares; options exercisable through May 2, 2025: 246,403 .
- Ownership as % of shares outstanding: All directors and executive officers held less than 1% of outstanding class A and class B shares individually .
- Unearned Equity at FY-end: 210,844 unearned equity incentive units (RPUs) valued at $26,587,428 .
- Pledging/Hedging: UPS prohibits executive officers and directors from hedging or pledging UPS stock; short sales prohibited .
- Ownership Guidelines: CEO 8x annual salary; counted holdings include class A shares, deferred units, and RSUs/RPUs; as of Dec 31, 2024, all NEOs subject for ≥5 years exceeded targets .
| Category | Detail | Amount |
|---|---|---|
| Class A Shares | Direct/indirect | 442,022 |
| Class B Shares | Direct/indirect | 13,036 |
| Options Exercisable (by 5/2/2025) | Shares | 246,403 |
| Unearned Incentive Units (RPUs) | Units; Market value | 210,844; $26,587,428 |
| Deferred Comp Balances | UPS Deferred Compensation Plan; UPS Restoration Savings Plan | $10,678,487; $297,080 |
| Pledging/Hedging | Policy | Prohibited |
Employment Terms
- Employment Contracts: UPS does not use employment or separate change-in-control agreements for executive officers; executives sign protective covenant agreements (confidentiality, non-compete, non-solicit) .
- Severance Plan (Key Employee Severance Plan): For CEO, upon involuntary termination without cause: cash equal to two times base salary plus two times target MIP; pro-rata MIP based on actual performance; COBRA differential; up to $30,000 career counseling; retirement-equivalent treatment for equity; options exercisable up to earlier of one year or original expiration .
- Change-in-Control: Double-trigger vesting for continued/assumed awards; otherwise, immediate vesting or prorated based on performance/period .
- Clawback: NYSE-compliant incentive-based compensation clawback policy covering executive officers .
| Scenario (as of 12/31/2024) | Separation Pay | Equity Vesting Value | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Involuntary Termination (without cause) | $9,079,636 | $12,686,122 | $21,765,758 |
| Change-in-Control (with qualifying termination) | $9,079,636 | $13,229,308 | $22,308,944 |
| Retirement/Death/Disability | — | $13,229,308 | $13,229,308 |
Board Governance
- Board Service: Director since 2003; UPS CEO since 2020 . Committee roles: Chairs the Executive Committee; members include Rod Adkins and William Johnson . She is the only non-independent director; all other directors and all committee members are independent .
- Dual-Role Implications: Independence preserved via separation of CEO and Board Chair since October 2020; William Johnson serves as independent Board Chair with executive sessions of independent directors at every regular board meeting .
- Board Activity & Attendance: Board met six times in 2024; all directors attended ≥75% of meetings and attended the 2024 annual meeting; independent directors held executive sessions at all regular meetings .
Compensation Committee Analysis and Shareholder Feedback
- Compensation Committee: Christiana Smith Shi (Chair), Rodney Adkins, Russell Stokes, Kevin Warsh; all independent; non-employee directors per Rule 16b-3; no interlocks .
- Independent Consultant: FW Cook advises the committee; independence reviewed and confirmed in Nov 2024 .
- Peer Group: AT&T, Boeing, Caterpillar, Cisco, Comcast, Deere, FedEx, Home Depot, Intel, J&J, Lockheed Martin, Lowe’s, McDonald’s, PepsiCo, P&G, Target, Walmart .
- Say-on-Pay: 2024 approval nearly 87% of votes cast .
Director Compensation (context for dual-role)
- CEO receives no director-specific compensation .
- Non-employee directors (2024): $120,000 cash retainer; $185,000 RSU grant; chair retainers: Audit $25,000; Compensation/NCG/Risk $20,000; Board Chair additional $160,000 cash and $70,000 RSUs .
- Effective 2025: Retainers increased to $125,000 cash and $195,000 RSU; Audit Chair $30,000; Compensation Chair $25,000 .
Compensation Structure Observations
- At-risk Mix: 94% of CEO target direct compensation considered “at risk” in 2024; annual goals reinstated for MIP; LTIP three-year performance with RTSR modifier .
- MIP payout below target (91%) due to revenue and operating profit shortfalls versus targets; service reliability exceeded target .
- 2022 LTIP payout at 42% reflects below-target EPS/FCF outcomes and underperformance in RTSR (14th percentile) .
- No tax gross-ups on equity awards or golden parachute excise taxes; double-trigger change-in-control vesting .
Risk Indicators & Red Flags
- Hedging/Pledging: Prohibited for executives and directors (reduces misalignment risk) .
- Related Party Transactions: None requiring disclosure since January 1, 2024 .
- Governance: Independent chair, majority-independent board and committees, annual elections, majority voting, executive sessions (mitigate entrenchment risk) .
- CFO Transition: Former CFO Brian Newman departed June 1, 2024; new CFO Brian Dykes appointed July 9, 2024 (management continuity and succession oversight noted) .
Equity Award Detail and Vesting Schedules (Selective)
| Options (CEO) | Grant Date | Exercisable | Unexercisable | Exercise Price | Expiration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 grant | 6/1/2020 | 81,008 | 20,253 | $99.28 | 6/1/2030 |
| 2021 grant | 2/10/2021 | 28,571 | 19,048 | $165.66 | 2/10/2031 |
| 2022 grant | 3/23/2022 | 10,142 | 15,215 | $214.58 | 3/23/2032 |
| 2023 grant | 3/22/2023 | 6,615 | 26,461 | $185.54 | 3/22/2033 |
| 2024 grant | 3/20/2024 | — | 39,090 | $154.76 | 3/20/2034 |
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: High at-risk mix and below-target payouts in both annual and long-term programs suggest compensation sensitivity to operating and TSR outcomes; LTIP underperformance (42% payout) indicates conservative realized compensation when multi-year targets are missed .
- Insider selling pressure: 2024 shows equity vesting of 24,930 shares and no option exercises disclosed, with significant unearned RPUs outstanding; options have standard 5-year vest, 10-year term, and no additional holding requirement, but hedging/pledging bans reduce near-term forced selling risk .
- Retention and succession: CEO severance economics are moderate for a large-cap (2x salary + 2x target MIP), with double-trigger equity; protective covenants and robust succession processes mitigate retention risk, though 2024 CFO turnover underscores the importance of ongoing leadership continuity .
- Governance quality: Independent chair, fully independent committees, strong ownership/pledging policies and majority voting support alignment; say-on-pay approval of ~87% suggests shareholder acceptance of program design .
Citations:
- Governance/roles/biography/age/education: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:31]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:34]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:33]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:8]**
- Financial/performance metrics: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:14]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:1]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:70]**
- MIP targets/payouts: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:42]**
- LTIP design/results: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:44]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:45]**
- Equity grants/vest/option terms: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:54]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:46]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:57]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:55]**
- Ownership/pledging/guidelines: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:75]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:76]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:48]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:47]**
- Employment/severance/CIC/clawback: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:49]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:62]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:63]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:50]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:48]**
- Compensation committee/consultant/peer group/say-on-pay: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:35]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:40]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:41]** **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:50]**
- Director compensation: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:36]**
- Related party transactions: **[1090727_0001090727-25-000038_ups-20250317.htm:17]**