Deirdre O’Brien
AppleAbout Deirdre O’Brien
Deirdre O’Brien is Apple’s Senior Vice President, Retail + People, overseeing Apple’s global retail stores and online teams alongside the People (HR) organization; she re-assumed this combined role in October 2024 after previously holding it from February 2019 to May 2023. She joined Apple in July 1988 and is 58 years old, with prior roles including Senior Vice President, Retail; Vice President, People; and Vice President, Operations, reflecting deep operating and talent leadership across Apple’s multi-decade scale-up . Apple’s 2024 performance context for incentive alignment: net sales $391.0B (+2% y/y), operating income $123.2B (+8% y/y), and company gross margin of 46.2% with strong Services growth; Apple returned over $115B to shareholders and reported above-target TSR outcomes driving elevated PSU vesting multipliers in recent years .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | SVP, Retail + People | Oct 2024–present | Leads global Retail and Online teams and Apple’s People team; remit integrates customer experience and talent strategy . |
| Apple | SVP, Retail + People | Feb 2019–May 2023 | Unified leadership of Retail/Online and People; supported multi-year growth and new product launches . |
External Roles
Not disclosed for Ms. O’Brien in Apple’s 2025 Proxy Statement executive officer biographies .
Fixed Compensation
Multi-year reported compensation (Summary Compensation Table):
| Metric (USD) | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary | $1,000,000 | $1,000,000 | $1,000,000 |
| Stock Awards (Grant-Date Fair Value) | $22,132,015 | $22,323,641 | $22,157,075 |
| Non-Equity Incentive (Cash Bonus) | $4,000,000 | $3,571,150 | $4,000,000 |
| All Other Compensation | $19,783 | $42,219 | $22,182 |
| Total Compensation | $27,151,798 | $26,937,010 | $27,179,257 |
- Target cash incentive opportunity is 200% of base salary ($2.0M) for named executive officers; 2024 structure unchanged and payout capped at 200% of target per metric .
- 2024 bonus paid at 200% of total target following outperformance on net sales and operating income; the committee did not apply the ±10% values modifier given the max quantitative outcome .
All Other Compensation detail for Ms. O’Brien (2024): $20,700 401(k) match + $1,482 term life insurance premium .
Performance Compensation
Annual Cash Incentive (Apple Inc. Executive Cash Incentive Plan)
| Metric | Weighting | Target | Threshold/Max mechanics | 2024 Actual | Payout |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Sales (GAAP) | 50% | 100% of salary | 50%–200% of target; linear interpolation; per-metric cap 200% | Exceeded maximum goal | 200% of metric target |
| Operating Income (GAAP) | 50% | 100% of salary | 50%–200% of target; linear interpolation; per-metric cap 200% | Exceeded maximum goal | 200% of metric target |
| Values/Community Modifier | n/a | ±10% to total | Discretionary modifier; overall award cap remains 200% | No adjustment applied | n/a |
Notes: 2024 reported net sales $391B and operating income $123.2B, resulting in maximum payout opportunity for NEOs .
Long-Term Equity (RSUs)
- Award mix (NEOs incl. O’Brien): 50% Performance-based RSUs (PSUs) in Relative TSR vs S&P 500; 50% time-based RSUs; target equity award value $20M (granted Oct 1, 2023 for FY2024 program) .
- Performance metric and scale: 25th percentile = 25% payout; 55th percentile = 100%; 85th percentile or above = 200%; negative absolute TSR caps vesting at 100% .
- Vesting and cadence: FY2024 time-based RSUs vest in three equal annual installments starting April 1, 2026 (approx. 4.5-year schedule); PSUs cliff-vest Oct 1, 2026 based on 2024–2026 Relative TSR .
- 2024 PSU result (vested Oct 1, 2023 on 2020 grants): 153% of target based on Relative TSR 70.77th percentile (Apple TSR 54.09%) for the 2020–2023 performance period .
- 2021 PSU result (vested Oct 1, 2024 on 2021 grants): 187% of target for NEO awards based on program terms disclosed in Outstanding Equity Awards footnotes .
Grant sizing (FY2024 program; grant date 10/01/2023):
| Component | Shares/Units (Target) | Vesting |
|---|---|---|
| Time-based RSUs | 58,408 | 3 equal annual installments beginning April 1, 2026 . |
| PSUs (Relative TSR) | 58,408 target (0–200% payout), threshold 14,602, max 116,816 | Cliff on Oct 1, 2026; payout based on S&P 500-relative TSR percentile . |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Beneficial ownership (common) | 136,572 shares as of Jan 2, 2025 “Table Date”; excludes 412,636 RSUs not vesting within 60 days . |
| Shares outstanding | 15,037,874,000 shares outstanding as of Table Date . |
| Ownership % of outstanding | ~0.0009% (136,572 / 15,037,874,000) based on figures above . |
| 2024 stock vested | 249,577 shares vested; value realized on vesting $43,351,279 (incl. $754,906 dividend equivalents) . |
| Outstanding unvested awards (9/28/2024) | Time-based: 29,688 (2020 award); 45,376 (2021); 66,477 (2022); 58,408 (2023). PSUs (target): 66,477 (2022); 58,408 (2023) . |
| Upcoming key vesting dates | Time-based: Apr 1, 2025/2026/2027 for 2020–2023 awards; PSUs: Oct 1, 2025 (2022 grant) and Oct 1, 2026 (2023 grant), subject to performance . |
| Stock ownership guidelines | Exec officers must hold ≥3x base salary within 5 years; each 2024 NEO holds shares in excess of guidelines . |
| Hedging/pledging | Hedging, short sales, and pledging of Apple stock are prohibited for directors and executive officers . |
| Dividend equivalents | Only paid if underlying RSUs actually vest (vesting/performance conditions met) . |
Employment Terms
| Topic | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment | At-will; no employment contract . |
| Severance | No guaranteed cash severance arrangements disclosed for NEOs . |
| Change-of-control | No change-of-control payments; no CIC gross-ups; equity does not automatically accelerate on CIC (standard death/disability provisions apply) . |
| Equity acceleration (non-CEO NEOs) | Time-based RSUs: full acceleration upon death; partial acceleration of next tranche upon disability. PSUs: service vesting waived pro rata upon death/disability; shares delivered after performance period based on actual results . |
| Clawbacks | SEC Rule 10D-1 policy for erroneously awarded incentive comp; additional discretionary recoupment for misconduct, confidentiality breach, theft/fraud, etc. . |
| Options | Apple does not currently grant stock options to employees; NEOs may participate in ESPP . |
| Perquisites | Limited; for O’Brien 2024 “All Other Comp” reflects standard benefits (401(k) match and term life), not special perqs . |
Performance & Track Record (Context for Incentives)
| Measure | 2024 Result |
|---|---|
| Net Sales | $391.0B (+2% y/y) . |
| Operating Income | $123.2B (+8% y/y) . |
| Company Gross Margin | 46.2% (+210 bps y/y) . |
| Services revenue | All-time record; +13% y/y (narrative highlight) . |
| Shareholder returns | >$115B returned in 2024 . |
| TSR linkage | 2024 absolute TSR 33.72%; 4-yr TSR 107.59% vs peer group 98.69%; PSU outcomes trending at/above target; 2020 PSU tranche paid at 153%; 2021 PSU tranche at 187% . |
Compensation Committee and Peer Framework (Program Governance)
- People and Compensation Committee members: Andrea Jung (Chair), Alex Gorsky, Art Levinson .
- NEO pay structure for 2024: Base $1M, target cash incentive $2M (200% of base), target equity $20M (50% PSUs / 50% RSUs) per NEO; CEO structure differs .
- Say-on-Pay: 92% approval at 2024 Annual Meeting .
- Primary peer group includes mega-cap tech/communications/semis/fintech leaders (e.g., Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Meta, Visa, etc.) to benchmark CEO pay and program structure; program emphasizes long-term equity alignment .
Investment Implications
- Pay-for-performance alignment: O’Brien’s incentive profile is heavily equity-linked with 50% of LTI tied to three-year Relative TSR against the S&P 500, reinforcing alignment with shareholder returns while time-based RSUs support retention over ~4.5 years; 2024 cash incentive tied 50/50 to Net Sales and Operating Income with capped payout and a values-based modifier .
- Selling pressure windows: Material vesting dates cluster around April 1 (time-based RSUs; 2025–2027) and October 1 (PSUs; 2025–2026 subject to performance), which can create episodic insider selling supply, although Apple prohibits hedging/pledging and maintains trading-policy controls .
- Retention risk: Long vesting cycles, PSU performance gates, and robust stock ownership requirements (≥3x salary; O’Brien in compliance) mitigate near-term flight risk; absence of CIC severance or option repricing reduces shareholder-unfriendly risk factors .
- Governance/oversight: Strong clawback regime, prohibition on pledging/hedging, and consistent Say-on-Pay support (92%) indicate low governance red flags and sustained investor tolerance for Apple’s incentive design amid solid operating performance and TSR .