Mike McDermott
About Mike McDermott
Mike McDermott (age 59) is Pfizer’s Chief Global Supply and Quality Officer, Executive Vice President (EVP) since January 2025, having served as Chief Global Supply Officer, EVP (2022–2024), President of Pfizer Global Supply (2018–2021), and earlier leadership roles in PGS and Biotechnology (2012–2018) . His mandate spans global manufacturing, quality, and supply reliability—central to Pfizer’s 2024 cost realignment ($4.0B net savings delivered toward a ~$4.5B 2025 target) and the multi-year Manufacturing Optimization Program launched in Q2 2024 to reduce cost of goods sold . Context for incentive alignment: Pfizer reported 2024 revenues of $63.6B with non-GAAP financials hitting/above max targets for the annual bonus pool (funded at 195% for 2024), but TSR has been challenged (one-year -5.3%, three-year -48.5%) .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pfizer Inc. | Chief Global Supply and Quality Officer, EVP | 2025–present | Enterprise leadership of global supply and quality; role elevated amid manufacturing optimization and margin expansion focus . |
| Pfizer Inc. | Chief Global Supply Officer, EVP | 2022–2024 | Led PGS through cost realignment and COGS-reduction program launch . |
| Pfizer Inc. | President, Pfizer Global Supply (PGS) | 2018–2021 | Oversaw global manufacturing network and supply operations . |
| Pfizer Inc. | Vice President, Pfizer Global Supply | 2014–2018 | Senior leadership within PGS . |
| Pfizer Inc. | Vice President, Biotechnology Unit | 2012–2014 | Led biotech unit operations . |
External Roles
- None disclosed in company filings reviewed .
Fixed Compensation
| Element | Detail | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base salary | Not individually disclosed for McDermott | Pfizer targets market-median (50th percentile) pay setting for executives; salary set annually by Compensation Committee for executives/NEOs . |
| Target bonus % | Not individually disclosed for McDermott | Annual incentive funding based on company-wide GPP metrics; individual awards reflect unit and individual performance . |
| Actual bonus (latest year) | Not individually disclosed for McDermott | 2024 GPP funded at 195% overall; 2023 ELT bonuses were zero due to financial underperformance vs targets . |
Performance Compensation
- Annual incentive (GPP) structure (2024): 40% Total Revenue, 40% Adjusted Diluted EPS, 20% Cash Flow from Operations; pipeline (+/–25 pp) and ESG (+/–5 pp) modifiers, capped at 200% . 2024 financial results were at or above maximum on all three metrics; pool funded at 195% (down from formulaic 200%) .
| 2024 GPP Metric (for annual incentive purposes) | 2023 Actual | 2024 Threshold | 2024 Target | 2024 Maximum | 2024 Actual |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total Revenue ($B) | 59.3 | 55.7 | 59.7 | 63.7 | 63.7 |
| Adjusted Diluted EPS ($) | 1.95 | 1.96 | 2.16 | 2.36 | 3.15 |
| Cash Flow from Operations ($B) | 9.3 | 2.6 | 4.0 | 5.4 | 13.0 |
- Long-term incentives (enterprise design for executives/NEOs):
- 2024 mix: 50% Performance Share Awards (PSAs), 25% 5‑year TSRUs, 25% 7‑year TSRUs .
- 2025 change: 50% PSAs, 50% 5‑year TSRUs; PSAs use annual operational metric (Adjusted Diluted EPS), with relative TSR modifier vs DRG index; GPP shifts to use Adjusted Net Income (replacing EPS) for 2025 .
- 2024 LTI modifications (Retention measure): Eligible employees (≈9,000, including NEOs) could elect to extend 2022/2023 TSRUs by two years (5→7 years) and extend PSA performance periods by two years (2022 vests/settles 2027; 2023 in 2028), maintaining a 0–200% cap (capped at target if TSR is negative) .
| LTI Instrument | Performance metric | Original terms | 2024 Modification (if elected) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 5‑year TSRUs | Absolute TSR | Vest ~3 years; settle on 5th anniversary | Term extended by 2 years (2022 settle 2029; 2023 settle 2030); vesting extended to 5th anniversary . |
| PSAs (2022/2023) | Adj. Net Income (3 x 1‑yr goals) + relative TSR | 3‑year performance; settle in 2025 (2022) / 2026 (2023) | Extend to 5 years; performance measured over final 3 years; settle in 2027 (2022) / 2028 (2023); payout capped at target if TSR negative . |
Implications for insider selling pressure: the two‑year vesting/settlement extensions increase retentive value and likely defer potential share delivery windows, reducing near-term supply from settlements if elected .
Equity Ownership & Alignment
- Stock ownership guidelines: CEO 8x salary; other NEOs 4x salary; progressive 5‑year milestones; sales restricted if below interim targets . None of the NEOs or other executive officers have pledged Pfizer stock; hedging/derivatives trading is prohibited by policy .
- Individual beneficial ownership: Not disclosed for McDermott (Securities Ownership table lists Directors and NEOs; executives as a group own <1% of shares outstanding) .
Employment Terms
- Non‑compete: In 2024/early 2025 Pfizer approved implementing non‑compete provisions via new agreements for senior management (including NEOs and other ELT members), effective 2025—raising switching costs and retention protection in critical roles like global supply .
- Executive Severance Plan (illustrative structure per NEO program):
- Severance = greater of (a) one year’s pay (base + target bonus) or (b) 13 weeks + 3 weeks per full year of service (cap 104 weeks), plus up to 24 months of medical/dental/life at active rates .
- Change‑in‑control (CIC): If terminated other than for cause within 24 months of a CIC, TSRUs continue to vest to original dates; PSAs continue and settle based on actual performance; RSUs continue vesting to original schedule (no single‑trigger) .
- Clawback/recoupment: The Regulatory & Compliance Committee can recommend reduction/recoupment of incentive compensation for significant misconduct .
Performance & Track Record (context for role)
| Measure | 2024 result | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Revenues ($B, GAAP) | 63.6 | 7% operational growth; 12% ex‑COVID products; aligns with 2024 financial overachievement vs incentive plan . |
| Net cost savings target ($B) | 4.0 delivered | Toward ~$4.5 target by end 2025 from cost realignment; Manufacturing Optimization Program initiated Q2 2024 to cut COGS . |
| TSR | 1‑yr: -5.3%; 3‑yr: -48.5%; 5‑yr: -11.4% | As of year‑end 2024 (proxy TSR summary) . |
These outcomes underscore why supply, quality, and COGS execution—areas under McDermott’s remit—are central to margin expansion and pay-for-performance alignment (195% GPP pool driven by max financials in 2024) .
Related Party Transactions (red flags review)
- Pfizer paid ~$350,000 in FY 2024 to Inventive Floor Design, Inc. (industrial flooring contractor) owned by the brother‑in‑law of Mike McDermott. Relationship pre‑dates his executive officer status; services at arm’s length; McDermott had no supervision/retention role; Governance Committee reviewed/approved under related‑party policy .
Say‑on‑Pay & Shareholder Feedback (program risk sentiment)
- Historical support: 92.8% approval in 2023 advisory vote; Board describes consistent strong support over past years .
- 2024/2025 engagement: Management proactively engaged investors on the 2024 LTI modification tender (approx. 9,000 employees eligible); added robust proxy disclosure per investor requests .
Expertise & Qualifications
- Thirty‑plus years of operations/supply leadership at Pfizer (progressive roles since at least 2012), culminating in enterprise responsibility for global supply and quality—experience directly aligned to cost, reliability, and compliance levers that drive margins and cash flows .
Compensation Structure Analysis (signals)
- Mix skew: High at‑risk pay via PSAs/TSRUs remains; 2025 re‑weighting to 50% PSAs and 50% 5‑year TSRUs increases sensitivity to absolute TSR recovery and EPS delivery .
- Metric rigor: 2024 financial targets outperformed materially (max on all three); Committee still trimmed pool from 200% to 195%, suggesting governance discipline amid weak TSR optics .
- Retention mechanics: 2024 election‑based extension of 2022/2023 awards is a company‑wide retention tool that defers vesting/settlement and ties upside to longer‑term performance recovery—likely reducing short‑term selling pressure if executives elected in .
Investment Implications
- Alignment: McDermott’s mandate (global supply & quality) sits squarely on Pfizer’s margin‑expansion and COGS‑reduction priorities; incentive metrics (revenue, EPS, cash flow; PSAs with EPS/relative TSR) strengthen linkage between operational execution and pay .
- Retention risk: 2025 non‑compete adoption for senior management and 2024 LTI term extensions mitigate flight risk in a critical function; however, program modifications acknowledge stock underperformance and seek to sustain motivation over a longer runway .
- Governance: Related‑party vendor tie to McDermott’s brother‑in‑law was reviewed under policy; arm’s‑length and pre‑existing—monitor but low governance risk as structured .
- TSR overhang: Despite strong 2024 operating results and cost progress, multi‑year TSR remains weak; the 2025 LTI design (PSAs + 5‑year TSRUs) increases exposure to TSR/EPS, amplifying the signal value of supply‑driven margin gains under McDermott’s purview .
Note: Individual compensation amounts, grants, ownership, pledging status, and Form 4 trading history for Mike McDermott were not disclosed in the reviewed filings. Program features and company‑level outcomes are shown to assess alignment and incentives. **[78003_0000078003-25-000054_pfe-20241231.htm:82]** **[78003_0000078003-25-000062_pfe-20250313.htm:59]** **[78003_0000078003-25-000062_pfe-20250313.htm:70]** **[78003_0000078003-25-000062_pfe-20250313.htm:74]** **[78003_0000078003-25-000062_pfe-20250313.htm:75]**