Daniel Pinto
JPMORGAN CHASE &About Daniel Pinto
President & Chief Operating Officer of JPM until June 30, 2025; expected to retire at end of 2026 and continue as Vice Chairman through 2026, per January 2025 leadership update . He became sole President & COO in January 2022 after serving as Co‑President & Co‑COO since January 2018, and previously led JPM’s Corporate & Investment Bank (CIB) as Co‑CEO starting in 2012 and sole CEO from 2014 to 2024 . Under his operating leadership, JPM reported record managed revenue of $180.6B, record net income of $58.5B, and ROTCE of 22% in 2024, reflecting strong execution across businesses . Compensation for 2024 is heavily equity‑deferred and tied to ROTCE outcomes via PSUs, aligning pay with long‑term shareholder returns and safety and soundness objectives .
Past Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Strategic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | Co‑President & Co‑Chief Operating Officer | 2018–2021 | Enterprise execution and cross‑LOB transformation, risk and operating discipline . |
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | President & Chief Operating Officer | 2022–Jun 30, 2025 | Oversight of firmwide functions, capital/liquidity/IRR stewardship, AI capability development; stepping down June 30, 2025 . |
| JPMorgan Chase & Co. | Vice Chairman (expected) | 2H 2025–2026 | Senior advisory/transition role during CEO succession period . |
| J.P. Morgan CIB | Co‑CEO | 2012–2013 | Drove market‑leading positions; integration and modernization across CIB . |
| J.P. Morgan CIB | CEO | 2014–2024 | #1 global IB fees; #1 Markets revenue; record CIB results and returns . |
External Roles
| Organization | Role | Years | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| J.P. Morgan Securities plc (UK subsidiary) | Board Director | Various | Received board fee; included in salary footnotes (fn 7). |
Fixed Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base Salary ($) | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000 | $1,500,000 |
| Cash Incentive ($) | $5,000,000 | $5,000,000 | $5,000,000 |
Performance Compensation
| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSUs (Grant Date Fair Value, $) | $22,000,000 | $23,500,000 | $25,000,000 |
| RSUs (Grant Date Fair Value, $) | — | — | — |
| Variable Pay Mix (Cash/RSU/PSU) | Cash ≤25% cap; PSUs 100% of equity | Cash ≤25% cap; PSUs 100% of equity | Cash ~17%, PSUs ~83% of variable pay |
| PSU Design Detail | 2024 PSU Program Terms |
|---|---|
| Performance Metric | Absolute and relative 3‑yr average ROTCE; payout 0–150% . |
| Absolute ROTCE Scale | ≥18% → 150% payout; <6% → 0% payout . |
| Relative Peer Set | BAC, BCS, COF, C, DB, GS, HSBC, MS, UBS, WFC . |
| Risk Hurdle | CET1 <8% at any year‑end → up to one‑third downward adjustment per year . |
| Vesting/Hold | 3‑yr cliff vest then 2‑yr holding period (UK awards: 7‑yr vesting schedule) . |
| 2021 PSU Outcome | Vested at 150% on Mar 25, 2025 (Firm ROTCE 2022–2024 avg 20%) . |
| 2024 Plan‑Based Grants (made in 2024) | PSUs (Target #) | PSUs (Max #) | RSUs (#) | Grant Date Fair Value ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Daniel Pinto | 141,401 | 212,101 | — | $23,500,000 |
Equity Ownership & Alignment
| Ownership Detail (as of Feb 28, 2025) | Amount |
|---|---|
| Common Stock Owned | 669,771 shares |
| Additional Underlying Stock Units (unvested RSUs/PSUs, deferred units, 401(k) equivalents) | 826,343 units |
| Total Beneficial + Underlying | 1,496,114 |
| Ownership as % of Outstanding | <1% individually (all insiders each <1%) |
| Outstanding Awards at FY‑end 2024 | Quantity | Key Terms |
|---|---|---|
| SARs (unexercisable) | 750,000; strike $159.095; expire 12/14/2031 | Exercisable in year five; in‑the‑money value $60,461,250 at 12/31/2024 . |
| Unvested RSUs | 530,297 units; market value $127,117,494 | Standard 2‑ & 3‑yr installments . |
| Unearned PSUs | 461,331 units; market value $110,585,654 | 3‑yr cliff vest; 2‑yr hold . |
| Stock Vested in 2024 | Shares | Value Realized ($) |
|---|---|---|
| Daniel Pinto | 170,536 | $31,790,704 |
Alignment and restrictions:
- Stock ownership guidelines for OC members: accumulate 200,000–400,000 shares or $10–$30 million; satisfy within 6 years; retain 75% of net shares until guideline met, then 50% thereafter (CEO 75%) .
- Anti‑pledging and anti‑hedging: OC members cannot hedge shares owned or pledge shares held directly; no margin accounts; unvested RSUs/PSUs and unexercised options/SARs cannot be hedged or pledged .
- Director/NEO say‑on‑pay support: 91% in 2024, reflecting shareholder approval of pay‑for‑performance program .
Employment Terms
| Provision | Terms |
|---|---|
| Employment Agreement | None; at‑will employment . |
| Severance | Broad‑based plan; capped at one year of base salary, not to exceed $400,000; welfare benefits up to six months; discretionary payment in lieu of annual incentive possible, subject to release and restrictions . |
| Change‑of‑Control | No golden parachutes; no special cash/equity acceleration solely due to change‑in‑control . |
| Continued Vesting on Termination | Death: RSUs/PSUs vest/accelerate per plan; Disability: continue vesting on schedule; Resignation with full‑career eligibility: continued vesting, subject to post‑employment restrictions . |
| Non‑compete/Resignation Conditions | For continued vesting under full‑career eligibility, no services for a financial services company or work in profession; government/education/non‑profit allowed . |
| Government Office Provision | Continued vesting for covered government service; acceleration only if required by ethics laws; all clawback and post‑employment obligations apply . |
| Clawbacks/Recovery | Strong clawback provisions (misconduct, restatement, risk failures, protection‑based vesting tests); Exchange Act Rule 10D‑1 recovery policy adopted; no OC clawbacks executed in 2024 . |
Investment Implications
- Compensation alignment: High proportion of variable pay in at‑risk PSUs with absolute/relative ROTCE hurdles, 3‑yr vest and 2‑yr hold promotes long‑term value creation; 2021 PSU payout at 150% evidences strong results and formulaic linkage .
- Retention and transition risk: Announced retirement at end‑2026 and stepping down from COO in mid‑2025 increases leadership transition risk, though he remains Vice Chairman through 2026 and JPM’s bench/succession process is well‑developed .
- Insider supply and selling pressure: 2024 vesting generated ~$31.8M in realized value; substantial unvested RSUs/PSUs and in‑the‑money SARs exist, but stringent retention, anti‑hedging/anti‑pledging and 2‑yr PSU holding periods mitigate near‑term selling pressure .
- Governance safeguards: No employment agreement or golden parachute, capped severance, robust clawbacks, CET1 risk hurdles on PSUs, and ownership/retention policies reduce misalignment and support investor confidence; strong say‑on‑pay support (91%) affirms shareholder acceptance .
Note: Firm‑level performance cited (managed revenue, net income, ROTCE) reflects Pinto’s operating leadership environment rather than individual attribution; JPM uses managed basis and ROTCE non‑GAAP measures for compensation decisions .